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Europe
Poland
30 July 2024 A new ’pro’-EU government came to power in Poland in December, drawing a line under a period when Warsaw and Budapest were regularly allies in disputes with the bloc over issues such as the rule of law or LGBT rights. Relations between Poland and Hungary have soured over Budapest’s decision to maintain warm economic and diplomatic ties with Russia, and more recently its blocking of European Union refunds for member states that gave munitions to Kyiv. On Saturday, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán delivered a speech in which he accused Poland of hypocrisy and of buying Russian oil through intermediaries. “They lecture us on moral grounds, they criticise us for our economic relations with Russia, and at the same time they are blithely doing business with the Russians,” he said. Simmering tensions concerning Warsaw and Budapest’s differences over Ukraine erupted into a diplomatic spat. Online magazine Visegrad Insight published an interview on Monday in which Polish Foreign Minister Sikorski said that his Hungarian counterpart, Szijjártó, appeared to change his mind about a Polish proposal to hold an EU meeting in Ukraine after receiving instructions from Budapest. (Sikorski) has crossed another line and lied when he claimed that I enthusiastically supported his nonsense proposal to hold the next informal meeting of EU foreign ministers in Ukraine, Szijjártó posted on his Facebook page. (Source: euractiv - Headquarters Brussels, Belgium; „with Reuters” - United Kingdom)
Jul 30, 2024 at 2:28 PM EDT A convoy of American military vehicles has been pictured rolling across Poland's highways as the U.S. Army moves equipment to a site within the NATO member country to boost the alliance's eastern flank. Polish news outlet Radio Zet published an image of tanks next to a report of how residents in the regions of Lubuskie and Wielkopolska had noted an increase in military vehicles traveling on the roads. The outlet said that, until the end of September, the U.S. Army will move equipment from a military base in Mannheim, Germany, to warehouses in Powidz, where there is a NATO-funded Army Prepositioned Stocks (APS) storage facility. The warehouses in Powidz are adjacent to the airport, which allows for the rapid transfer of equipment by air, along with ammunition stocks if necessary, the outlet reported. The site will eventually host 87 tanks, over 150 infantry fighting vehicles and 18 self-propelled howitzers. In June, the U.S. Army said that 14 M1 Abrams tanks and an M88 armored recovery vehicle had arrived at the site, located around 250 miles west of Poland's border with Ukraine. Wojcik, a retired U.S. Army colonel, a senior fellow at The Center for European Policy Analysis (CEPA) told last month that the site would eventually be fully equipped for an armored brigade. ’It could be deployed to fight within a few days’, rather than waiting for a month for the equipment to arrive by ship. (Source: newsweek - U.S.)
Slovakia
July 30, 2024 Slovak Prime Minister Robert Fico said a technical solution is on the table involving several countries which could renew the Lukoil transit. He has threatened to stop sending diesel fuel to Ukraine in response to the halting of Lukoil's crude oil transit through Ukraine, following Kyiv's imposition of sanctions on the Russian oil giant last month. If the transit of Russian gas through Ukraine won’t be renewed shortly, Slovnaft [the country’s Slovnaft refinery, controlled by Hungary's MOL] won’t continue with fuel supplies to Ukraine which covers one-tenth of the Ukrainian consumption, Fico said in a video message. Fico pointed out he called in the Ukrainian ambassador Kastran for a meeting in which he said he reminded him that the Slovak public very negatively assesses the step of the Ukrainian president against Lukoil. Hungarian Minister of Foreign Affairs Szijjártó has described the situation as an oil security risk, stating that Hungary will continue to block the disbursement of funds from the European Peace Facility (EPF) for Ukraine. Slovakia and Hungary have protested to the EU over Kyiv's move but have so far received a cool response, given that other countries have already taken painful steps to cut their dependence on Russian oil supplies. Hungary, Slovakia, and Czechia were exempted from EU sanctions on Russian crude oil pipeline imports until the end of this year due to their high dependency on it but were expected to use that time to reduce their dependence; instead Hungary has actually increased its dependence on Russian oil imports. The European Commission is not rushing to settle the dispute as the Ukrainian move did not cause 'an immediate problem, given that it only affects Lukoil imports' – which amount to 2mn tonnes a year. All oil flows through Druzhba are due to end at the end of this year anyway unless Ukraine agrees to continue the transit contract with Russia. Fico also reiterated that the war in Ukraine needs to be ended with an immediate ceasefire. Fico concluded by saying that he refuses the politics of a new iron curtain between Russia and the EU and that the EU if it wants to get out of total influence of the USA, it will have to think about forms of cooperation with the Russian Federation which should include cooperation in the area of strategic goods. (Source: intellinews - Germany)
Asia
India
30 Jul 2024 Landslides in southern India triggered by torrential monsoon rains have killed dozens of people with hundreds more feared trapped under mud and debris in the southern coastal state of Kerala. (Source: aljazeera - Qatar)
Philippines
Jul 30, 2024 Amid heightened tensions in the disputed South China Sea, just months before the U.S. votes in a November presidential election that will have broad ramifications for Asia, the United States unlocked an "unprecedented' $500 million in security assistance for the Philippines during high-level talks in Manila on Tuesday, U.S. Defense Secretary Austin said. He and Secretary of State Blinken met with Philippine defense chief Teodoro and Foreign Secretary Manalo for the countries’ first-ever two-plus-two talks in Manila since the format began in 2012 as the officials agreed on key steps to bolster the Philippine military and continue modernizing the alliance. A large portion of the latest U.S. military assistance, described as a “once-in-a-generation investment,” would go into modernizing the Philippine military and coast guard to help Manila shore up its defenses in response to a recent series of violent clashes between Chinese and Philippine vessels in and near disputed waters, particularly around a Philippine outpost on Second Thomas Shoal. Over $128 million would be used to upgrade facilities within nine Philippine military sites U.S. forces have access to under the allies’ 2014 Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement (EDCA). Funding was also made available to support Manila's cybersecurity capabilities. The roadmap is expected to see Manila continue to receive equipment such as radars, military transport aircraft and drones, as well as coastal- and air-defense systems. The two sides also said negotiations on a General Security of Military Information Agreement (GSOMIA) were progressing and would be finalized within the year. The officials also again emphasized that the 1951 U.S.-Philippine mutual defense treaty applies to armed attacks on either nation's armed forces or public vessels “anywhere in the Pacific and in the South China Sea.” Coming only days after a similar two-plus-two gathering Sunday between U.S. and Japanese officials, these meetings are indicative of a broader U.S.-led regional defense strategy that aims to restrict China’s maritime reach within the so-called first island chain, of which the Philippines is on the front lines. This strategy features multilateral coalition-building and relies on critical contributions from several countries, including Japan, the Philippines and Australia. A number of countries - allies and partners - have been attempting to shore up ties with the camp of Republican nominee and former leader Trump, who as president repeatedly expressed a disdainful view of the U.S. alliance system. Austin sought to reassure Manila that the current momentum in bilateral ties “enjoys bipartisan (congressional) support.” The Philippines’ proximity to both Taiwan and key sea lanes in the South China Sea makes it an attractive staging point for the U.S. and its allies that could boost their ability to respond to regional crises. Manila granted U.S. forces access to four additional military locations last year - in addition to five previous ones. Three of the new EDCA sites face north toward self-ruled Taiwan, while the other is near the South China Sea. China claims large parts of the South China Sea, including the Second Thomas Shoal, where the Philippines maintains a small military garrison atop a rusty naval ship, the Sierra Madre, that it deliberately grounded in 1999 to reinforce its claims in those waters. The two sides agreed to allow Philippine resupply missions for purely humanitarian purposes, meaning allowing Manila to provide its contingent on Second Thomas Shoal with food and medical supplies but not military equipment or construction materials. (Source: japantimes)
Turkey
July 30, 2024 11:06 am CET President Erdoğan told a meeting of his ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) earlier on Monday that Turkey ’must be very strong so that Israel can’t do these ridiculous things to Palestine.' ’Just like we entered Karabakh, just like we entered Libya, we will do [something] similar exactly to them,’ Erdoğan said, referring to Turkey’s past military interventions. In light of Turkish President Erdoğan's threats to invade Israel and his dangerous rhetoric, Foreign Minister Katz instructed diplomats … to urgently engage with all NATO members, calling for the condemnation of Turkey and demanding its expulsion from the regional alliance, the Israeli foreign ministry said Monday. Turkey joined NATO in 1952 and has the alliance’s second-largest army. NATO does not have a specific mechanism to suspend or expel a member, though members may voluntarily withdraw. Dutch ’far-right’ leader Wilders, whose party is the largest in the Netherlands, called Erdoğan an Islamofascist in a social media post on Sunday, adding that Turkey should be kicked out of NATO. Wilders has long proposed expelling Turkey from the alliance. The Netherlands, unlike Israel, is also a NATO member. NATO Secretary-General Stoltenberg dismissed the possibility of creating such a mechanism in 2021, saying it would never happen. (Source: politico - U.S.)
North America
United States
July 30, 2024, 5:00 AM 'Would the U.S. consider assassinating Putin?’ Regime change has not worked out well for U.S. interests: the overthrow of Hussein in Iraq was no small factor in bringing about the Arab Spring, with effects that continue to reverberate across the Middle East as reflected by unresolved civil wars in Libya, Syria, and Yemen, as well as ’ongoing political instability in Egypt’ and Tunisia. The U.S. occupation of Iraq also facilitated the rise of the islamic state. And the Taliban ultimately outlasted the United States in Afghanistan by returning to power despite 20 years of American blood and treasure, and they now give sanctuary to insurgent groups threatening Pakistan, Iran, its Central Asian neighbors, ’and China’. More recently, the United States made no pretense in concealing its hand in killing Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Quds Force Commander Suleimani in January 2020, an action that historic precedent would suggest was an act of war. Only the strike against Suleimani occurred while he was abroad. Operations to depose Mosaddegh in Iran depended rather on internal elements to facilitate the plots. The U.S. governments have arguably favored the status quo of a predictable adversary. Should the United States and its allies seek to depose Putin by 'enabling' a coup in his absence, or assassinating him during such travels? The answer lies in assessing the risk versus gain. If the bar was juxtaposing the status quo with the consequences of Putin’s violent removal, would Russia’s threat to the United States and its allies be degraded? Would Russian troops withdraw from Ukraine and cease posing a threat to NATO allies in the Baltics and Eastern Europe? Or might Russian intentions become even more hostile and less predictable? "Putin is fairly predictable. The inclination to accept the known status quo is further strengthened when that country is armed with nuclear weapons". As regards Russia, ’even under the most ideal circumstances’ in which the U.S. government could remove Putin and conceal its hand in doing so, how confident is Washington that a stable and less hostile leadership would succeed him? In Russia, like most autocracies, power rests with those who control the nation’s instruments of power - primarily the guns, but likewise the money, infrastructure, natural resources, connections, and knowledge of where the skeletons are to be found. That power is currently concentrated within a small circle of septuagenarians, almost all of whom have long ties to Putin, the Cold War-era KGB, and St. Petersburg. The Russian Armed Forces might have the numbers in terms of troops and tools, but under Putin, as it was in Soviet days, they are kept on a tight leash and closely monitored, with little discretionary authority for drawing weapons or coming out of their garrisons. The three organizations most capable of moving on Putin and the Kremlin are the Federal Security Service, or FSB; the Rosgvardia, or National Guard; and the Presidential Security Service within the Federal Protective Service, or FSO. The FSB is Russia’s internal security and intelligence arm through which Putin governs given its relatively massive and ubiquitous presence across all the country’s institutions. The FSB enforces Putin’s rule, monitors dissent, intimidates, punishes, and liaises with organized crime. Bortnikov leads the FSB, having succeeded Patrushev, who followed Putin and has served since as one of his chief lieutenants. Until recently, Patrushev served as Russian Security Council chief and was most likely the Kremlin’s no. 2, and might still be, despite having been made a presidential advisor for shipping. Bortnikov, like Patrushev, shares Putin’s world view, paranoia for the West, political philosophy, and glorification of the old Soviet empire. Bortnikov is considered by Kremlinologists to be Putin’s most relied-upon and trusted subordinate, and in turn, the individual best positioned to overthrow him, should he desire. Uncorroborated rumors suggest health issues. His deputy, Korolev, some 10 years younger, is regarded as effective, similarly ruthless, but perhaps too ambitious and ostentatious in his relationships with Russian organized crime. It’s likely that Putin sees a bright future for Korolev but has enough reservation to justify more seasoning and evaluation before having him succeed Bortnikov. The Rosgvardia is Putin’s brute force. It was established in 2016 from among the interior ministry’s militias variously responsible for internal order and border security to be Putin’s long red line against protests, uprisings, and armed organized coup attempts. The roughly 300,000-strong Rosgvardia is commanded by longtime former Putin bodyguard Zolotov. Likewise a part of Putin’s septuagenarian St. Petersburg crowd, with extensive past ties to organized crime, Zolotov emerged somewhat from the shadows following then-Wagner Group leader Prigozhin’s June 2023 revolt. Zolotov claimed credit for protecting Moscow and mused publicly at how his organization would likely grow and secure more resources to facilitate its critical responsibilities. Zolotov might not be as educated or sophisticated as Putin’s traditional siloviki associates, all former Cold War-era KGB veterans, but making his way up the ladder as he did from a St. Petersburg street thug, he’s not averse to using force to achieve his aims. Little is publicly known concerning Zolotov’s politics apart from loyalty to his boss, but there’s no evidence he might offer a progressive alternative less hostile to the West. As Putin has done for all of those in his inner circle to secure their loyalty, Zolotov’s family members have been awarded land, gifts, and key posts. Patrushev’s son, for example, is now a deputy prime minister. The FSO includes the Presidential Security Service, some 50,000 troops, and is responsible for Putin’s close physical protection. Little is known about its director, Kochnev, now 60, whose mysterious official bio indicates that he was born in Moscow, served in the military from 1982 to 1984, and then went into “the security agencies of the USSR and the Russian Federation” from 1984 to 2002, after which time he was officially assigned to the FSO. If Kochnev wanted Putin dead, he’s had plenty of time to pursue that goal, but he is unlikely to have the means and network to go further on his own in seizing power. Kochnev would still need the FSB and the Rosgvardia to accomplish the mission so would likely be an accomplice, but he would not be at the forefront of such a plot. There are likewise a handful of others close to Putin who might influence his succession, or be the face of it, such as Sechin, former deputy prime minister and current Rosneft CEO; former KGB Col. Gen. Ivanov, also a former defense minister and first deputy prime minister; and former KGB Col. Gen. Ivanov, who also had a stint as the Federal Narcotics Service director. All are known to be ideologically in line with the Russian leader and seek a restored empire unwilling to subscribe to a world order and rules created by the West that they believe aim to keep Moscow weak and subservient. If Putin were assassinated abroad, regardless of the evidence, the old guard would likely accuse the United States and use it as a lightning rod to consolidate power and rally the public. And sharing Putin’s paranoia over the West’s existential threat, the risk is credible that they would retaliate militarily, directly, and with uncertain restraint. Believing themselves insecure, they would likewise crack down at home in an indiscriminately ruthless manner that might unleash long-contained revolutionary vigor among the population, which would throw a large, nuclear-armed power into chaos. But could the United States do it if it wanted to? History shows that foreign leaders are not immune to assassination. Slovakian Prime Minister Robert Fico survived being shot at close range by a disgruntled citizen in May. Unlike in the movies, however, assassinations are complicated, particularly against well-protected and deliberately unpredictable targets in foreign environments over which one has no control. According to leaked documents and the account of Karakulov, a former engineer and FSO captain, Putin is paranoid concerning his safety and health. Karakulov’s observations, Putin’s limited travel, and his proclivity to cloister himself from direct contact with but a small number of insiders for his safety makes him a hard target. Scrupulous care for his movements includes the intense vetting, quarantining, and close monitoring of those involved with his transportation and his personal routine as well as in securing the cars, trains, and planes he uses. For any such operation to succeed, close target reconnaissance and good intelligence are required to determine patterns and vulnerabilities on which to construct a plan. But while foreign head-of-state visits follow certain protocols and have predictable events, there are no long-term patterns within which to easily identify vulnerabilities. Other considerations include a means to infiltrate and exfiltrate the various members executing the operation as well as their tools. ’North Korea is not an easy place to visit’ let alone operate in for a foreign intelligence service to clandestinely steal secrets or conduct an observable action such as an assassination. There are certainly additional risks when Putin or any foreign leader ventures beyond the layered, redundant, and tested security protocols enjoyed in their home cocoons. Visiting dignitaries must rely on the host government for a variety of resources and needs too numerous and costly to pack, and when doing so would offend the locals. And that extends to perimeter and route security, emergency medical support, and infrastructure integrity. ’The threat to a foreign leader’s communications security, habits, health information, and that of their entourage is higher while in transit abroad - and therefore an attractive intelligence target’. The multiple moving pieces and complicated logistics associated with such visits produce information that must be shared with the host governments and span agendas, itineraries, dietary requirements, flight and cargo manifests, communication frequencies, telephone numbers, email addresses, travelers’ biographic details, and weapons, to name a few. 'Even with the best-laid plans for protecting Putin, one weak link could be the Russian leader’s self-imposed vulnerability, depending on the aging and problematic Soviet-designed Ilyushin Il-96 series jets he uses, as he did in recent travels to North Korea and Vietnam. Even if Russia builds and updates the replacement parts, there is long-term structural fatigue and limitations when trying to reconfigure so old an airframe design. While there’s arguably an element of Putin’s pride in wishing to use Russian equipment, it can be suspected that his inclination is driven more by paranoia for what adversaries might implant on his transport that prevents him from adopting newer Western aircraft, as his country’s commercial airlines have'. There are also significant bureaucratic hurdles to lethal operations. For the moment, at least, the U.S. practice of covert action is dictated by the rule of law. These are primarily executive orders rather than public laws, like EO 12333, which 'ironically forbids assassination', and the various presidential memos issued by Obama in 2013, Trump in 2017, and Biden in 2022 guiding the use of 'direct action,' the euphemism for drone strikes and other kinetic operations, against terrorist targets outside of conflict zones. But while the United States killed Suleimani as a terrorist who fit these guidelines, 'killing foreign leaders based on credible intelligence reflecting their ongoing efforts to do harm to the United States would reasonably still meet the legal bar for preemptive self-defense'. When it comes to killing Putin or any prominent adversary, the biggest challenge is not necessarily if it can be done, but whether it should be done. Russia, as Putin frequently reminds the West in his saber-rattling speeches threatening nuclear war, is another matter. What happens if you fail? (Source: foreignpolicy - U.S.)
by London, a professor of intelligence studies at Georgetown University’s School of Foreign Service and a nonresident scholar at the Middle East Institute, a former CIA operations officer. He served in the CIA’s Clandestine Service for more than 34 years - including three assignments as a chief of station and as CIA’s counterterrorism chief for South and Southwest Asia. He is the author of The Recruiter: Spying and the Lost Art of American Intelligence.
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