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Balkans
The EU’s China policy: no clear policy. The EU has framed its China strategy around three coexisting tracks: partnership, competition and rivalry, pulled the strategy in different directions in recent years, weakening the original compromise and producing fragmented policy. Rhetoric remains strong in the cooperation track, particularly on climate change, green industries and AI. Practical cooperation is limited and has now become mostly ritualistic, centred on ceremonial summitry statements of little consequence. China’s dominance in rare earth minerals, and its willingness to use that dominance to achieve its geopolitical goals, has foreclosed substantive cooperation, pushing Europe to seek out other partnerships in this field. In relation to AI, the EU and China have exchanged views, but they have not undertaken any substantive discussions on AI governance. This space is becoming an arena for competition with China, as the EU launches initiatives such as InvestAI (€200bn) and its AI Gigafactory Fund (€20bn). Competition is ranging from electric vehicles, specialised machinery, advanced manufacturing, electrical equipment, chemicals, renewable energy technologies, high-tech products and more. China has shown little appetite to change its industrial model - subsidies, export support, overcapacity and restricted market access for foreign firms reinforcing the competitive dynamics of the past few years. The EU and China are increasingly facing each other off in third markets across the globe, particularly in South-East Asia and Latin America. During the second Trump administration both the EU and China seek to diversify away from a protectionist America. Beijing’s intransigent refusal to address EU concerns over unfair trade practices is also producing systemic effects, even if the EU hesitates to define them in this manner, as tensions with US president Trump are so heightened. For similar reasons, Britain has refrained from including China in the top tier of its covert foreign influence register. Drifting towards decoupling, a total disentanglement across all sectors. In practice, however, competition is accelerating, undermining the possibility of a deliberate policy choice. As the EU tries to reverse asymmetries with China (like unequal market access) that is facing strong Chinese resistance. In this context, not only is the EU itself likely to continue to clash with China, but some member states such as France are even keen to go further and apply much wider, generalised tariffs in order to protect French and EU industries from China. Trade with China has become increasingly complicated. A patchwork of measures against Beijing: The EU’s recent actions make the direction clear: it is moving towards decoupling. The EU has rolled out a suite of legal instruments aimed at boosting its economic security and strategic autonomy: The Anti-Coercion Instrument (2023) - the EU has considered using it amid trade tensions with China and the US; The Foreign Subsidies Regulation (2023) - targets distortions which have granted unfair advantages to non-EU firms, especially Chinese ones, in acquisitions and public procurement contracts; The EU’s International Procurement Instrument (2022) - used for the first time in June 2025, it ensures reciprocity in access to international procurement markets, addressing the difficulties EU companies have faced in China when competing in its expanding procurement market. It was partially restricting Chinese medical device manufacturers’ access to the EU’s €150bn market in response to barriers faced by EU firms in China. The European Commission has initiated several proceedings against major Chinese online retailers. These include the Chinese marketplace AliExpress not doing enough to prevent the sale of counterfeit goods and unsafe products. Whether to impose sanctions is still pending. The commission has also initiated an investigation into Chinese retailer Shein for potentially violating EU consumer protection linked to sale of illegal goods. In October 2024, it opened formal proceedings against Temu, Chinese retail platform, for potential violations of the Digital Services Act, examining whether Temu has sold non-compliant products, as well as its recommendation algorithm and the allegedly addictive design of the platform. At the member-state level, Italy and Germany have attempted to block the transfer of private data of EU citizens by DeepSeek, the Chinese AI-powered chatbot. This practice of individual EU member states could expand in the future. The development of a China conditionality defining and implementing conditions for the Western Balkan candidates to engage with China remains a work in progress. Historically conditions focused on political, economic and legal reforms were monitored during the accession process to ensure alignment, their implementation by the prospective EU member state is deemed essential for integration into the EU. Accession in the region is at markedly different stages. Kosovo lacks a clear path forward. Montenegro deep into the process which is advancing while any possible China conditionality is still in development. That gap stems mostly from the absence of a stable, EU-wide consensus on China. Steps towards the China conditionality continue to resemble a loose collection of principles rather than a well-defined and coherent structure of conditions, laws and practices expected from the Western Balkan countries. ’Ideally’, what should be in question is a wider Western conditionality that incorporates shared US and EU interests, albeit in a political rather than institutional context. This could cover areas such as export controls, investment screening and data security. So far no structured dialogue has taken place between the EU and US to arrive at a common understanding on a China-related conditionality beyond some ad hoc considerations, for instance in the area of security. Washington and the respective capitals in the Western Balkans remain focused on regional stability and increased economic engagement. As things stand, the EU and the US are more likely to pursue the fulfilment of their conditions separately. With the EU, the US administration is grappling with an unclear and evolving China policy - for example export restrictions on chip manufacturing software. Likewise, export controls on Nvidia’s powerful H20 chip, vital for AI development, have been inconsistent. The US has also all but ceded green energy as an area of rivalry, given its dismissive approach to the sector. The current US administration does not have a structured China containment policy. Including the China element in accession negotiations: Recent updates on membership talks with Serbia show very few chapters in which China is discussed - for instance, Chapter 30 (external relations); chapter 31 (foreign, security and defence policy) are even listed in some detail, but not as a point of conditionality. Chapter 5 (public procurement) does not set out corrective measures. Accession chapters, which could address China-related issues: Chapter 5 (public procurement), barely mentioned in the Montenegro process; Chapter 10 (digital transformation and media), which could incorporate China’s penetration in 5G networks in the Western Balkans and the role of Chinese actors in the media; Chapter 19 (social policy and employment), which could address frequent violations of labour law by Chinese companies in Serbia; Chapter 31 (foreign, security and defence policy), which could tackle the growth of Western Balkan defence and security ties with Beijing. Instances of non-compliance with EU law are already emerging. In the area of public procurement, Montenegro has signed and prepared numerous bilateral agreements which contain non-competitive clauses in relation to public tenders in different sectors. The case of the Bar-Boljare motorway, for example, simply appointed the China Road and Bridge Corporation as the executer of the project, bypassing competitive tender. Such clauses exist in agreements with the UAE (in tourism and real estate) and Hungary (in road and rail transport and infrastructure). Integration and political promiscuity: More than two decades since the prospect of EU membership was presented to the Western Balkan states, progress has stalled. The geopolitical context shifts. Today, the practice of interacting with many actors in order to obtain concessions from all of them, is the norm in the region. China’s central feature is a society-based approach to engagement. It is now increasingly engaging directly with societal groups across numerous areas, such as trade, defence, culture, academia, media and more. China’s influence is also driven by acquisitions of local companies, assets and infrastructure. Financial lending now goes beyond the Belt and Road Initiative and other state-led frameworks, with Chinese firms and banks deploying finance and direct investments in various sectors. The EU’s longstanding three-element formula of cooperation, competition and rivalry no longer reflects the real dynamics of the EU-China relationship. The dominant theme is competition and there remains a lack of consensus among member states on how to define and approach relations with Beijing. In recent years, the use of instruments resemble a patchwork. ’But they all point to increasing confrontation’ in numerous domains. The European Parliament monitoring and adopting resolutions on Chinese actions in south-eastern Europe, is often more critical than the European Commission. The China conditionality is defined in a broader context with the participation of the US, both between Brussels and Washington and between the US and the countries of the Western Balkans. This process is presently complicated by the absence of clear American policy towards China, and the transactional tendency of the US administration ’which has sidelined security considerations’. Elites in the region increasingly face a dilemma between political integration and promiscuity, with multiplying evidence pointing to a preference for the latter. Recommendations: Be more decisive about enlargement and about China: The EU continues to follow its three-element policy formula towards China, which has little operability in the enlargement context. Create a balance between requirements and incentives. The EU enlargement process has morphed into an endless game of defining and communicating requirements and conditions without a clear time horizon. A better balance between requirements and incentives would go some way towards countering this imbalance. Define a firm timeline for accession: Generations of citizens, thousands have emigrated from the region in pursuit of their individual European dreams, while many continue to plan this journey. Companies and various institutions also define and implement strategies on the basis of no realistic timeline of EU membership. Embedding these strategies in a European framework would be much easier with a firm time horizon of EU accession. The EU needs to engage wider society and citizens, the ultimate beneficiaries. Integration is about creating and embedding linkages between citizens, companies, civil society, local and regional authorities, and cultural and academic structures. (Source: The European Council on Foreign Relations – Headquarters in Berlin)
by Shopov, a visiting fellow with the Asia programme at the European Council on Foreign Relations, with 20 years of experience. He is a graduate in political science and comparative politics from Sofia University St. Kliment of Ohrid and the London School of Economics and Political Science. He has also studied in Oxford University, London University (Queen Mary College), New School for Social Research, California State University, Peking University and King’s College London. He was adviser on EU affairs to the minister of home affairs (1997-1998), counsellor at the Bulgarian mission to the EU in Brussels (1998-2001), EU adviser at the British embassy in Sofia (2002-2003) and adviser to the minister of foreign affairs (2014-2017). He has worked with numerous companies from Austria, Belgium, Germany, Spain, Sweden, UK, US and others. Shopov has also worked with the European Parliament, MEPs, the European Commission, the British Council „and many other European and Asian policy and research centres”.
Note:
About 'conditionalities'... from the Balkans, near the aging Italy, Turkey, without mentioning Greece, Bulgaria... far from the European Union's interests led (astray) by Germany... What is so amazing about the Balkans being an area of infiltration for larger powers, Hungary being almost the only one within the Union that continuously represents cooperation and advocates for the accession and inclusion of the countries of the region in the EU ?
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