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January 09, 2025 The unstoppable rise of energy realism. 'For the last decade, Democrats and the left have ever more eagerly embraced a climate catastrophist narrative on energy policy. That narrative may be summarized as follows: Climate change is not a danger that is gradually occurring, but an imminent crisis that is already upon us in extreme weather events. It threatens the existence of the planet if immediate, drastic action is not taken. That action must include the immediate replacement of fossil fuels, including natural gas, by renewables, wind and solar, which are cheap and can be introduced right now if sufficient resources are devoted to doing so, and which, unlike nuclear power, are safe. Not only that, the immediate replacement of fossil fuels by renewables will make energy cheaper and provide high wage jobs. People resist rapidly eliminating fossil fuels only because of propaganda from the fossil fuel industry. Any of the problems with renewables that are being cited, such as their intermittency and reliability, are being solved. This means that as we use more renewables and cut out fossil fuels, political support for the transition to clean energy should go up because of the benefits to consumers and workers'. 'It is not uncommon for Democrats to apply the term "climate denialist' to those who, while they accept the reality of global warming, refuse to endorse the climate catastrophist mantra and its maximalist policy agenda. They did manage to pass the misleadingly named Inflation Reduction Act which pumped hundreds of billions of dollars - if not over a trillion - into the renewable energy and electric vehicle industries. 'During the Biden administration, the share of renewables in the country’s primary energy consumption has increased only very modestly from 10.5 percent to 11.7 percent’. And the share of energy consumption from fossil fuels remains over 80 percent just as it does in the world as a whole. Energy realities have forced them to preside over record levels of oil production (both on federal lands and overall), record natural gas production, and record LNG exports. They just lost the presidential election to an opponent who says “drill, baby, drill” and whose priority is cheap, abundant energy - not clean energy. And Trump’s nominee to be Secretary of Energy is Wright, CEO of a fracking company, who has been forthright in his advocacy of energy realism, or as he puts it, “energy sobriety.” "Here’s his own 10 point summary of his perspective: Energy is essential to life and the world needs more of it!; The modern world today is powered by and made of hydrocarbons; Hydrocarbons are essential to improving the wealth, health, and life opportunities for the less energized seven billion people who aspire to be among the world’s lucky one billion; Hydrocarbons supply more than 80 percent of global energy and thousands of critical materials and products; The American Shale Revolution transformed energy markets, energy security, and geopolitics; Global demand for oil, natural gas, and coal are all at record levels and rising – no energy transition has begun; Modern alternatives, like solar and wind, provide only a part of electricity demand and do not replace the most critical uses of hydrocarbons. Energy-dense, reliable nuclear could be more impactful; Making energy more expensive or unreliable compromises people, national security, and the environment; Climate change is a global challenge but is far from the world’s greatest threat to human life; Zero Energy Poverty by 2050 is a superior goal compared to Net Zero 2050." It underscores the moral problems with the standard climate catastrophist/net zero approach. Lifting up the billions in the world who suffer from energy poverty and the stunted lives and living standards such poverty produces is or should be a moral imperative - a moral imperative about which net zero definitionally has nothing to say. 74 percent to 26 percent, working-class voters prefer an energy approach that uses a mix of energy sources including oil, coal, and natural gas along with renewables to an approach that seeks to phase out the use of oil, coal, and natural gas completely… 41 percent of these voters said the cost of the energy they use was most important to them and 35 percent said the availability of power when they need it was most important. Just 17 percent thought the effect on climate of their energy consumption was most important and 6 percent selected the effect on U.S. energy security. Asked to consider proposals to reduce the effects of global climate change, these voters were least likely to say ’getting the U.S. to net zero carbon emissions as quickly as possible’ was very important to them personally (26 percent), fewer than said “limiting the burden of regulations on business” was very important (33 percent). Working-class voters were most likely by far to say keeping consumer costs low (66 percent) and increasing jobs and economic growth (60 percent) were very important aspects of climate mitigation proposals. Finally, by 30 points (59 to 29 percent) working-class voters flat-out favor more domestic production of fossil fuels like oil and gas. But only 15 percent of these voters are aware that the Biden administration increased oil production on federal lands. However, when informed that the U.S. has, in fact, increased domestic production of oil and gas in the last several years, they are delighted. Almost three-quarters (73 percent) of working-class voters said “this is a positive development, which brings good jobs for U.S. workers, ensures our energy supply and helps the U.S. support our allies who need similar resources” compared to 27 percent who thought ’this is a negative development, which brings more pollution, climate change, and continued reliance on fossil fuels.’ Can Democrats wean themselves away from climate catastrophism and their obsession with net zero? It could be difficult. Their net zero commitment stems from the extremely high priority placed on this goal by the educated elites and activists who now dominate the party. These elites and activists - unlike working-class voters - believe that nothing is more important than stopping global warming since it is not just a problem, but an ’existential crisis’ that must be confronted as rapidly as possible to prevent a global apocalypse. President Biden said in September, 2023: 'The only existential threat humanity faces even more frightening than a nuclear war is global warming going above 1.5 degrees in the next 20—10 years. That’d be real trouble. There’s no way back from that’. More frightening than nuclear war, eh, from which there is presumably a way back? Up and down the Democratic Party, rhetoric has been more similar than not to Biden’s absurdly histrionic take. That’s an awful lot of rhetoric to walk back. The reality is that climate change policy, to be politically successful, must be embedded in and subordinate to, the goal of energy abundance and prosperity. There is no point in setting goals and timelines that cannot be met. Discarding these will make it much easier to pursue an energy abundance path that also includes reasonable progress on reducing emissions over what will undoubtedly be a very lengthy time period. Democrats would be well-advised to develop this path - their own version of energy realism - rather than pursuing the dead-end of climate catastrophism. The latter is and has been a loser. Energy realism will beat it every time. (Source: American Enterprise Institute - United States)
by Teixeira, a Nonresident Senior Fellow
(January 8, 2025) / December 2024 The China-Russia relationship and U.S. foreign policy. Initiative focused on U.S. strategy toward the People’s Republic of China (Detail). Brics. China and Russia have also expanded their diplomatic arsenal to include non-Western multilateral institutions, where they exert even greater influence. In this spirit, Beijing and Moscow founded the BRICS - a group established in 2009 by Brazil, Russia, India, and China, and joined the next year by South Africa. As of this writing, BRICS has hosted fifteen summits. In 2014, after Russia annexed Crimea and deployed forces in eastern Ukraine, for instance, the BRICS leaders called only for “a comprehensive dialogue” and “the de-escalation of the conflict,” without acknowledging Russian aggression. The group was similarly quiet after Putin’s February 2022 full-scale invasion of Ukraine, and only expressed support for “talks between Russia and Ukraine,” consistent with China’s position that would cede to Russia all Ukrainian territory it occupied. At a June 2024 meeting of BRICS foreign ministers, the organization was also highly critical of Israel’s military action in Gaza and voiced its “serious concern at Israel’s continued blatant disregard of international law,” with no mention or condemnation of Hamas, mimicking the position of the Chinese and Russian governments. BRICS communiqués have also stressed the need to develop a new group reserve currency to reduce their reliance on the dollar and shield against U.S.-led economic sanctions - a process spearheaded by China and Russia as they increasingly trade in their own currencies. In July 2015, BRICS established the New Development Bank to provide financial assistance to developing states, absent the human rights requirements imposed by the World Bank. The organization further championed a global economic pivot away from the West in August 2023, when the bloc advocated “reform of the Bretton Woods institutions . . . including in leadership positions,” proclaimed “the importance of encouraging the use of local currencies in international trade,” and announced their opposition to “unilateral illegal measures such as sanctions” as used by the United States. To undermine the influence of Western financial institutions such as the banking messenger SWIFT, the BRICS launched a payment task force and a rival payment mechanism - BRICS Pay - and, in the weeks before the October 2024 summit in Kazan, BRICS finance and central bank officials met in Moscow. There, Russian Finance Minister Siluanov continued to push for an alternative international financial system, arguing, “It is necessary to form new conditions or even new institutions . . . within the framework of our community, within the framework of BRICS.” During his remarks at the Kazan summit, Xi made a similar argument, as he insisted that “the urgency of reforming the international financial architecture is prominent.” The group also challenged attempts by Western states to curtail Chinese electric vehicles and climate technology flooding their markets, as in June 2024 when BRICS condemned “unilateral, punitive and discriminatory protectionist measures,” with no mention of China’s own unfair trade practices. Consistent with their efforts to organize nations against Western policies and standards, Beijing and Moscow have expanded BRICS membership. In August 2023, Argentina, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates were invited to become BRICS members. Apart from Argentina, which declined, and Saudi Arabia, which remains undecided at this writing, all invitees subsequently joined. Ahead of visits by Putin and Chinese Premier Li to Southeast Asia in June 2024, Thailand and Malaysia announced their intention to join the bloc as well; in August 2024, Azerbaijan asked to join the group, followed by a formal request from Turkey a month later, and then by Cuba in early October 2024. Thirty-six delegations participated in the October 2024 BRICS summit, including over twenty heads of state. In Kazan, Xi announced four new initiatives - the BRICS Deep-Sea Resources International Research Center, China Center for Cooperation on Development of Special Economic Zones, China Center for BRICS Industrial Competencies, and BRICS Digital Ecosystem Cooperation Network - aimed to bolster Beijing’s own interests and investment opportunities while promoting China-dependent industrial development in BRICS countries. The group also established a BRICS Grain Exchange, a Russian initiative designed to dilute the dollar’s dominance in food exports. Thus, an ever larger and more influential BRICS grouping seeks to reduce the impact of Western-led institutions around the world, and to diminish U.S. influence, especially in the Global South. SCO. With the same intent, Beijing and Moscow formed the Shanghai Cooperation Organization in June 2001. The SCO includes China, Russia, Belarus, India, Iran, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Pakistan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan, and covers 80 percent of the Eurasian landmass, 40 percent of global population, and almost 30 percent of global gross domestic product (GDP). The organization advocates a “multipolar international order,” in contrast to what Beijing and Moscow assert is a U.S.-dominated, hegemonic international system. In November 2022, the SCO outlined its aim to create a “Greater Eurasian Partnership” comprised of SCO countries, the Eurasian Economic Union, and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations. The organization consistently affirms support for China’s BRI and provides diplomatic backup for the Kremlin’s war in Ukraine, including via communiqués that condemn the West’s “unilateral economic sanctions.” A July 2023 declaration by SCO leaders lamented the “unilateral and unlimited expansion of global missile defense systems by certain countries or groups of countries,” a clear reference to U.S. policy. With Xi at his side in July 2024, Putin explicitly labeled the SCO as a “new framework” to replace “the obsolete Europe-centric and Euro-Atlantic models that granted unilateral advantages to certain states” and warned that “[t]he use of force is increasing, the norms of international law are systemically being violated, geopolitical confrontation and conflicts are growing, and risks to stability in the world and the SCO region are multiplying.” Putin decried “unilateral attempts to resolve this Palestinian deadlock, most notably by the United States” and repeated his claim that the conflict in Ukraine is “a result of the reckless and intrusive policies of the United States and its satellites.” Beijing also used the July 2024 SCO Summit to condemn the United States, as Xi cautioned his audience about the “real risks of small yards with high fences,” a reference to U.S. policy on export of key technologies to China, and called on the members to “resist external interference.” More important, China continually reinforces Russia’s war aims in Ukraine and conducts disinformation campaigns that adopt Russia’s formulation that the invasion is a “special military operation,” provoked by the United States and NATO expansion. China’s barrage of misleading information includes fabricated stories about U.S. bioweapon laboratories in Ukraine, claims that the United States and Ukraine falsified footage of the atrocities in Bucha, and assertions that Ukraine’s military - rather than Russian forces - was responsible for the civilian deaths in the Kramatorsk bombing. In February 2023, Beijing issued a twelve-point proposal for negotiations between Moscow and Kyiv, a plan that failed to condemn the invasion and opposed Western sanctions against Russia. In April 2024, Lavrov unsurprisingly endorsed China’s proposal as “a reasonable plan that the great Chinese civilization proposed for discussion.” The Kremlin agreed to enter such negotiations on the condition that they reflect “new realities” on the battlefield - a signal that Russia will demand control of its occupied territories in Ukraine under the Chinese settlement framework.On the sidelines of the UN General Assembly in September 2024, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang partnered with Brazilian foreign policy advisor Amorim to rally developing countries behind Beijing’s peace proposal. Ukrainian officials have openly condemned China’s support of the Russian position on Ukraine. Beijing and Moscow also work to take advantage of fractures in the NATO alliance, including by seeking closer ties to Budapest. Hungary and China promoted their bilateral relationship to an “all-weather, comprehensive strategic partnership” in May 2024, and Hungary has been one of the largest beneficiaries of China’s BRI in Europe (alongside Serbia). Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orbán visited Moscow in April 2022 and again in July 2024, in defiance of the EU and U.S. attempt to diplomatically isolate Russia. During his July 2024 talks with Putin, Orbán advocated “the shortest road to end the [Ukraine] war,” and in Orbán’s conversation with Xi the same month in Beijing, they declared, “China and Hungary share the same basic propositions and directions of efforts” on Ukraine - a perspective that includes China’s insistence on a permanent cease-fire that legitimizes Russian annexation of occupied Ukrainian territory. In parallel, the Kremlin has supported China’s policies in the Indo-Pacific. Amid growing tensions in the South China Sea in October 2021, Putin stood at Xi’s side and opposed “interference from non-regional powers,” an allusion to U.S. policy in the region. In March 2023, Lavrov criticized Western-led partnerships such as the Quad -a grouping that includes the United States, Australia, India, and Japan and the defense technology–sharing arrangement known as AUKUS - comprising Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States as instances of external interference in the Indo-Pacific, employed “not for economic purposes but trying to militarize.” Not long after, Russia again endorsed Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan and said it “firmly support[s] actions of the Chinese side for the defense of its state sovereignty and territorial integrity.” Putin doubled down in a speech following the March 2024 Russian presidential elections. He alleged that “unfriendly countries” were attempting “to make all kinds of provocations around Taiwan which is an inherent part of the People’s Republic of China.” When Lavrov and Wang met in April 2024, the pair claimed that NATO wished to expand into Asia and warned against the bloc “stretching its hands to our common home.” In October 2024, marking the seventy-fifth anniversary of China-Russia diplomatic relations, Lavrov condemned the United States directly, saying, “the United States and its satellites deliberately stir up the situation in the Strait of Taiwan” and reiterating that “Russia’s position on the Taiwan issue has been unchanged support for China’s territorial integrity.” At the East Asian Summit in Laos later that month, Beijing and Moscow blocked a proposed consensus statement drafted by Southeast Asian countries over language on the contested South China Sea, which Lavrov condemned as an effort by the United States to make a “purely political statement.” All told, China and Russia have made substantial progress in the past decade and more, in a joint global diplomatic offensive to undermine U.S.-led world order and Western values and to end American leadership in the international system. As Lavrov explained in October 2024, the China-Russia entente desires a “world order . . . adjusted to current realities,” achieved through the irreversible process of “power rebalancing.” (Source: Council on Foreign Relations - U.S.)
by Blackwill, Henry A. Kissinger Senior Fellow for U.S. Foreign Policy; Fontaine, CEO, Center for a New American Security
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