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Europe
France
November 18, 2024 'Ukrainian forces are preparing a potential 'counterattack' in the Kursk region'. The Ukrainians could soon be bolstered by thousands of soldiers who had recently completed training in France with light battle tanks and artillery. The French task force Champagne oversaw the training of more than 2,000 Ukrainian soldiers who will soon return to the frontlines. They'll be armed with 18 AMX 10 light tanks, 18 mobile Caesar artillery pieces, and 128 armored troop carriers. The newly formed Ukrainian brigade was fittingly named 'Anne of Kyiv' to honor the former Kyiv princess who became Queen of France after marrying King Henry I. The AMX-10 RC has been employed with French cavalry units since the early 1980s. A total of 457 were produced, and around 240 are reported to be in service with the French Army – while others were sold to Morocco and Qatar. The vehicles are armed with a 105mm F2 BK MECA L/47 main gun, and have been deployed in a reconnaissance role in contested environments and for fire support. A crew of four operates the tank destroyer, which first saw service in the 1980s Western Sahara War. It was later employed in the 1991 Gulf War, and the War in Afghanistan, as well as in recent French military operations in Mali. (Source: The National Interest)
Germany
18.11.2024 Germany is to deliver 4,000 strike drones to Ukraine, the daily Bild newspaper reported today. Kyiv is expected to receive the drones within the next few weeks. German Defense Minister Pistorius announced in June that he would support Ukraine with additional systems in its war with Russia. The drones will reportedly have a significantly higher range than the Ukrainian kamikaze drones and could also be deployed against tanks and Russian military positions. Internally, the drones are also referred to as “Mini-Taurus” in reference to the German cruise missile. Chancellor Olaf Scholz remains opposed to delivery of long-range Taurus cruise missiles to Ukraine, according to deputy government spokesperson Buchner. The Taurus missiles well-known for successfully targeting objects including bridges, or hard and deeply buried targets such as command bunkers could potentially reach the Russian capital Moscow with a range exceeding 500 kilometers. (Source: Anadolu Agency - Turkey)
November 18, 2024, Monday // 10:41 Habeck, the Vice Chancellor of Germany, received overwhelming support for his candidacy for chancellor, securing 96.48% of votes at the Green Party congress in Würzburg. Alongside Foreign Minister Baerbock, he will lead the Green Party's campaign for the ’upcoming February elections’. In a recent interview, Habeck discussed his stance on sending weapons to Ukraine, confirming that if he were to become chancellor, ’he would approve the delivery of Taurus cruise missiles’. As Germany's Minister of the Economy, he noted that decisions on arms supplies were among the most challenging he has faced in his career. Despite Habeck's support for sending such missiles, Chancellor Olaf Scholz has firmly opposed the idea. Scholz has expressed concerns that supplying Taurus missiles to Ukraine could potentially allow the country to strike targets in Moscow, escalating the conflict further. (Source: Novinite – Bulgaria)
Russia
Monday 18 November 2024 21:25 GMT Biden’s decision to let Ukraine strike targets inside Russia with US-made long-range missiles is an ’escalation’ of the conflict, Moscow said yesterday as it warned use of the weapons would trigger a ’tangible’ response. 'It is obvious that the outgoing administration in Washington intends to … continue pouring oil on the fire and provoking further escalation of tensions around this conflict,' Putin’s spokesperson Peskov said. Russian government newspaper Rossiyskaya Gazeta accused Mr Biden of one of the most provocative, uncalculated decisions of his administration… risking catastrophic consequences. Biden’s move – previously ruled out over fears of bringing about a direct confrontation between Russia and Nato – put fresh pressure on Britain to follow suit with UK-supplied Storm Shadow missiles. Keir Starmer at the G20 summit in Rio de Janeiro did not rule out a change, saying: ’We need to double down … to make sure Ukraine has what is necessary for as long as necessary, because we cannot allow Putin to win this war.’ Defence minister Eagle also hinted at a shift over weapons, telling MPs: “We intend to align with our allies in making sure that Ukraine can make use of the capabilities that’s been offered by those who have committed support to that country in its fight.” Zelensky has been lobbying Western allies for months for permission to strike targets in Russian territory, arguing he cannot hit the bases Mr Putin is using to launch air attacks against his country. Allies of the president-elect condemned the decision. Grenell, Mr Trump’s former director of national intelligence, accused Biden of escalating the wars before he leaves office and said that allowing Ukraine to fire long-range missiles at Russia amounted to launching a whole new war. Hungary’s foreign minister Szijjártó said it was incredibly dangerous. (Source: The Independent – United Kingdom)
November 18, 2024 10:13 IST The Russian MPs have threatened that ’Ukraine would be in ruins in the morning’ after reports of Biden's authorisation. Hours after reports emerged that US President Biden has authorised Ukraine to use U.S.-supplied ballistic missiles for attacks inside Russia, lawmakers in Moscow have reacted to the decision, stating this could escalate the conflict in Ukraine, leading to World War Three. The Russian lawmakers reacted that Biden's policy change meant that Ukrainian ruin was imminent. Klishas, a senior member of Russia's upper chamber of parliament, took to Telegram to post that the West has ’decided on such a level of escalation that it could end with the Ukrainian statehood in complete ruins by morning.’ Dzhabarov, first deputy head of the Russian upper house's international affairs committee, told TASS agency that Moscow's response will be immediate. ’This is a very big step towards the start of World War Three,’ the agency quoted Dzhabarov as saying. Slutsky, chairman of the State Duma lower house's foreign affairs committee, too said that the move could invite a tougher response. Zelenskyy has not yet confirmed the NYT report on Biden's policy change but hinted in vague terms that ’the number of missiles used to strike Russia’ is the more important fact than the authorisation. It is expected that the Ukrainians could use the ATACMS missiles to hit Russian ’and North Korean’ troop concentrations in Kursk. These troops are deployed by Russia so that it can retake the land from Ukraine before entering any negotiations. If Russia succeeds in retaking Kursks, Ukraine would have nothing in hand to trade for. (Source: The Week - India)
Asia
Lebanon
18.11.2024 At least 26 people were killed and dozens injured as Israel launched fresh airstrikes in southern Lebanon today. Israeli fighter jets conducted 10 airstrikes in the city of Nabatieh, leaving eight people dead and injuring several others. Six medics were also killed in an airstrike on a center of the Hezbollah-run Islamic Health Authority in the town of Arab Salim. One more person was killed in another attack in the Bent Jbeil district. Israeli warplanes also launched airstrikes in several areas near Tyre, killing 11 people and injuring 48 others. More than 3,400 people have been killed, over 14,600 injured and more than 1 million displaced by Israeli attacks since last October, according to Lebanese health authorities. Tel Aviv expanded the conflict by launching a ground assault into southern Lebanon on Oct. 1 this year. (Source: Anadolu Agency - Turkey)
Eurasia
November 18, 2024, 11:24 AM An important dynamic in an already complicated conflict is the increasing involvement of East Asian powers in a European war. Besides ’the recent arrival of at least 10,000 North Korean soldiers on the Russian side’, the evolving roles of China, Japan, and South Korea raise the question of whether a widening proxy war is being fought in Ukraine. Russia’s war against Ukraine has all the trappings of a proxy war - when two countries fight each other indirectly - by supporting warring participants in a third country. The war is setting a new precedent for Indo-Pacific nations to compete for their interests on the global stage. Their participation adds an element of uncertainty and potential escalation to the conflict in Ukraine.The security challenges in East Asia have, in part, been exported to Europe. The Kremlin has clearly articulated its view that Ukraine has no agency as an independent state ’and that the target of its invasion is the West’ - specifically, the United States. Members of NATO and several other Western-aligned countries, in turn, are supporting Ukraine with weapons deliveries. The West’s intention may be Ukraine’s defense, but its efforts are necessarily directed at Russia. By forcing Putin to fail in his goal of subjugating Ukraine, Western support for Ukraine undermines Russia. U.S. Defense Secretary Austin suggested as much, admitting that “we want to see Russia weakened.” Beijing, Pyongyang, Seoul, and Tokyo are supporting their respective partners on European soil in order to wage a much broader struggle over the future of the international order. This, in turn, indicates the extent to which the war has become global - and has set a new precedent for how Asian nations compete for their interests in other parts of the world. Despite China refraining from overtly providing Russia with weapons, it has worked to ensure Moscow’s ability to continue its war. Not only has it opposed Western sanctions, but it has also used its diplomatic connections in the global south to prevent a broader condemnation of Russia. According to U.S. Secretary of State Blinken, China now supplies Russia with about 90 percent of its microelectronics imports and 70 percent of machine tool imports. According to customs data, Beijing ships more than $300 million worth of dual-use goods to Russia every month. China this year participated in military exercises in Belarus, only a few miles from the Polish border. North Korea was one of only five countries that voted against the U.N. General Assembly resolution opposing Russia’s aggression. Last week Pyongyang ratified a military alliance that pledges either country to aid the other in case of attack. North Korea has provided Russia with artillery shells and ballistic missiles. The most escalatory step ’occurred last month, when North Korea sent about 10,000 troops to Russia’, some of whom are now reported to be fighting the Ukrainians in Russia’s Kursk region. Both Beijing and Pyongyang have an overarching strategic interest in seeing Moscow prevail. Chinese President Xi and North Korean leader Kim see Putin as an ally in a global struggle against the West, which makes supporting his war in Ukraine a strategic imperative. Both share Russia’s vision of a post-Western world order, in which the United States and its allies are weakened. Early on, Japan coordinated sanctions against Russia with Western partners. Tokyo also provides to Ukraine nonkinetic military equipment - including vehicles, flak jackets, and reconnaissance drones - as well as some $12 billion in other aid, making Tokyo one of Kyiv’s top bilateral donors. Japan also revised its restrictions on weapons exports, enabling the transfer of Japanese-manufactured Patriot missiles to the United States, thereby helping to ensure U.S. stockpiles remain stable even as some of this equipment is sent to help Ukraine. Diplomatically, during Japan’s 2023 G-7 presidency, then-Prime Minister Kishida extended invitations to various countries from the global south so that President Zelensky could engage with their representatives at the group’s May summit. South Korea has provided Ukraine substantial humanitarian aid and other nonlethal support, such as mine-clearing equipment, body armor, and helmets. It has also joined in economic sanctions against Moscow. And like Japan, it has replenished U.S. weapons stocks, supplying the United States with artillery shells and thereby freeing up Washington’s ability to send shells to Ukraine. Similarly, South Korea has greatly increased defense exports to Poland, part of which backfilled the latter’s deliveries to Ukraine in the early days of the war. Following the news of North Korean troops arriving in Russia, Seoul is now floating the idea of directly supplying Kyiv with defensive and offensive weapons. Proxy war motivations hold for Tokyo and Seoul. Kishida famously warned, “Ukraine today may be East Asia tomorrow.” Echoing Kishida, South Korean President Yoon told last year that “the war in Ukraine has reminded us all that a security crisis in one particular region can have a global impact.” Granted, the level of support currently from the East Asian powers will likely be a function of how committed the United States and Russia remain in the months and years ahead. Trump’s return to the White House could result in changes on the battlefield - but not necessarily in the nature of Indo-Pacific involvement. If he could end the war in a day - and both sides accept the outcome - then the proxy war ends. If he cannot and the conflict continues in some manner, so does the proxy war, but the level of commitment may change. In a situation where the United States stops supporting Ukraine but European NATO members step up, it is likely that Japan and South Korea would also continue their support which could be reduced, since some of their activities have come as a request by their U.S. ally. It is hard to see China and North Korea reducing their involvement, given that their support could help Russia succeed and advance their strategic goal of destroying the existing order. Changes in the degree of U.S. involvement under a second Trump administration will not alter the fundamental proxy war constellation: All four East Asian powers are supporting a third party to undermine their competitor’s ability to undermine their national interests. (Source: Foreign Policy – U.S.)
by Hornung, the Japan lead in the National Security Research Division at the RAND Corporation and an adjunct professor in the Asian Studies Program at Georgetown University.
North America
United States
(18 November 2024) Trump has campaigned on a promise to end the US involvement in wars and instead use taxpayers' money to improve Americans' lives. When the next president takes office, he can make his own decisions, State Department spokesman Miller said. ’We will use every day of our term to pursue policy interests that we believe are in the interests of the American people’. Biden's apparent green light for Ukraine at the weekend to ditch a long-standing red line to strike Russia with US-made long-range missiles has caused consternation among Trump's allies. Trump has always seen himself as a dealmaker and will not want Biden to take any such credit. People close to him have condemned the move as dangerous escalation. His son, Trump Jr, was among the first Republicans to respond. ’The military industrial complex seems to want to make sure they get World War Three going before my father has a chance to create peace and save lives," he said. Senator Vance, who will be Trump's vice-president, has regularly objected to providing arms to Ukraine. He argued that the US lacks the manufacturing capacity to continue providing weapons like the missile systems that Kyiv will use to strike within Russia. Polls suggest a large number of Republicans want US support for Ukraine to stop - 62% told a poll by Pew Research the US had no responsibility to support the country against Russia. The Institute for the Study of War, a think tank, has published a map of 225 Russian military installations within range of ATACMS. The Russian leader will be fully aware of the magnitude of the threat of Western-supplied long-range missiles. ’Ukraine has had ATACMS as well as UK and French Storm Shadow missiles of similar range for some time’, though the numbers are not known. But it has not been allowed to use them inside Russia. Former US envoy to Ukraine, Volker, said Biden's decision would enable Ukraine to go after airfields, the ammunition depots and the fuels supplies, logistics that Russia has, which right now are in a sanctuary zone in Russia. 'Biden's decision has not been formally confirmed and it may never be’. France and the UK are expected to follow the US lead and issue the same authorisation to Ukraine. The move also follows a barrage of Russian attacks: One strike on Odesa today killed 10 people, including seven policemen, and injured 47 others. (Source: BBC – United Kingdom)
November 18, 2024 2:45 pm (EST) With little more than two months left in office, President Biden reportedly allowed the use of American-provided Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) inside Russia. This comes a little more than a week after another post-election decision to allow a small number of U.S. defense contractors to fix U.S.-made weapons systems inside Ukraine, rather than forcing Ukrainians to take their weapons to North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) countries for repair. Biden has given Ukrainians access to almost all the weapons they have asked for - including Abrams heavy tanks, Bradley armored fighting vehicles, Patriot air-defense batteries, High Mobility Artillery Rocket Systems (HIMARS), and, most recently, F-16 fighter jets. Ukraine has crossed one supposed Russian red line after another - including repeatedly deploying drones to bomb Moscow and sending Ukrainian ground forces to occupy part of Russia’s Kursk province in August 2024. Ukraine now finds itself on the defensive and losing ground in the eastern Donbas region at the fastest rate since 2022. Russian troops are inching toward the key city of Pokrovsk, a major logistics and transportation hub that anchors the Ukrainian defense of the east. Russia has ramped up recruiting to keep up with its losses. Now its forces have been augmented by 10,000 North Korean troops as part of an offensive meant to drive the Ukrainians from the Russian Kursk region. ’It is the involvement of the North Koreans that evidently prompted Biden to reconsider his prohibition on Ukraine using ATACMS with a range of 190 miles against targets inside Russia’. (Some estimates put the total number possessed by Kyiv at less than fifty.) Biden had already allowed the Ukrainians to deploy HIMARS, with a range of fifty miles, ’inside Russia to defend Kharkiv’. ’It is possible that, following the U.S. decision, Britain and France could allow Ukraine to similarly utilize their SCALP/Storm Shadow cruise missiles, which have a range of about 155 miles’.The Institute for the Study of War, a Washington think tank, has identified hundreds of significant Russian military targets within 190 miles of the border with Ukraine. These now reportedly include the bases where North Korean troops have been preparing for their attacks on Ukrainian positions. Bloomberg has reported that Pyongyang could send around 100,000 more troops. The North Korean troop contributions can reduce the pressure on Putin to stage unpopular, involuntary call-ups of Russian reservists. ’Biden’s decision to extend ATACMS authority can help increase the pressure on Putin to negotiate’. Time could be running out for U.S. aid to Ukraine. President-Elect Trump takes office on January 20. He has pledged to end the war within a day, without spelling out how he could accomplish this feat. Many in Trump’s camp appear eager to cut off aid to Ukraine. ’How Ukraine is tapping the U.S. Arsenal? U.S. security assistance between January 20, 2020, and October 15, 2024: Infantry arms and equipment: 10,000 Javelin anti-armor systems; 120,000 other anti-armor systems and munitions; 3,000 Stinger anti-aircraft systems; 9,000 TOW missiles; 50,000 grenade launchers and small arms; 400 million rounds of small arms ammunition and grenades; 100,000 sets of body armor and helmets; Night-vision devices, surveillance systems, thermal imagery systems, optics, and laser rangefinders; C-4 and other explosives; Explosive-ordnance-disposal equipment; M18A1 Claymore mines; Anti-armor mines; Mine-clearing equipment; Obstacle-emplacement equipment; Medical supplies; Field equipment, cold-weather gear, generators, and spare parts; Chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear protective equipment; 27 armored bridging systems; Rocket launchers and ammunition; 25mm ammunition; Counter–air defense capability. Air defense: 3 Patriot air defense batteries and munitions; 12 NASAM systems; Avenger air defense systems; HAWK air defense systems and munitions; Laser-guided rocket systems; AIM-7 missiles; RIM-7 missiles; AIM-9M missiles; Antiaircraft guns and ammunition; Equipment to integrate with and sustain Ukraine’s systems and to protect critical infrastructure; VAMPIRE anti-drone systems and munitions; Anti-drone gun trucks and ammunition; Anti-drone laser-guided rocket systems; Air defense systems components; Other anti-drone equipment. Air-to-ground missiles: High-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARMs); Precision aerial munitions; 6,000 Zuni aircraft rockets (can function as air defense); 20,000 Hydra-70 aircraft rockets. Manned aircraft: 20 Mi-17 helicopters. Artillery: 200 155mm Howitzers and 3 million rounds, including 7,000 precision-guided rounds and 60,000 anti-armor mine rounds; 72 105mm Howitzers and 800,000 rounds; 10,000 203mm rounds, 400,000 152mm rounds; 40,000 130mm rounds, and 40,000 122mm rounds; 200 mortar systems; 600,000 mortar rounds; 40 HIMAR systems; 60,000 122mm Grad rockets; Ground-Launched Small Diameter Bomb launchers and ammunition; Army Tactical Missile Systems (ATACMS) Explosive and combat drones: Switchblade drones; Phoenix Ghost drones; ALTIUS-600 drones (can also be used for surveillance); Munitions. Surveillance drones: ScanEagle drones; Puma drones; JUMP 20 drones; CyberLux K8 drones; Penguin drones (can also be used as combat drone); Black Hornet drones. Tanks and armored carriers: 300 Bradley infantry fighting vehicles; 4 Bradley Fire Support Team vehicles; 31 Abrams tanks; 45 T-72B tanks (via the Czech Republic); 189 Stryker armored personnel carriers; 800 M113 armored personnel carriers; 400 M1117 armored security vehicles; 300 armored medical-treatment vehicles; 1,000 MRAP vehicles; 125mm, 120mm, and 105mm tank ammunition. Coastal defense: 2 Harpoon coastal defense systems; 100 coastal and riverine patrol boats; Unmanned coastal defense vessels; Port and harbor security equipment. Radar and communications: 4 satellite communications antennas; 2 radars for drones; 21 air surveillance radars; 100 counter-artillery and counter-; mortar radars; 50 multi-mission radars; Tactical secure communications systems; Electronic warfare and counter–electronic warfare equipment; 4 SATCOM antennas; SATCOM terminals and services. Ground support vehicles: 5,000 Humvees; 1,153 tactical vehicles; 200 light tactical vehicles; 80 trucks; 200 trailers; 10 command-post vehicles; 30 ammunition-support vehicles; 6 armored utility trucks; 20 logistics-support vehicles; 239 fuel tankers and 105 fuel trailers; 58 water trailers. Satellite services: Commercial satellite imagery services Note: Some numbers are approximations. Sources: U.S. Department of Defense; CFR research’. (Source: Council on Foreign Relations - U.S.)
by Boot
November 18, 2024 'It is a start'. It is estimated that there are several hundred high-value military targets, such as bases, command and control centers, air defense systems, logistical hubs, ammunition dumps, and transportation infrastructure, inside Russia and within easy reach of Ukraine’s Western long-range weaponry. 'ISW continues to assess that Russian forces will benefit from any partial sanctuary if Western states continue to impose restrictions on Ukraine's ability to defend itself and that the US should allow Ukraine to strike all legitimate military targets within Russia's operational and deep-rear within range of US-provided weapons – not just those in Kursk Oblast,' the Institute for the Study of War assessed in its latest operational estimate of the conflict. According to Le Figaro, European officials are debating on whether to follow the U.S. and allow the Storm Shadow (UK) and SCALP-EG (France) to be used against targets inside Russia. (Source: The National Interest - U.S.)
November 18, 2024 American „defense” planning in the shadow of protracted war - what it would take to deter or defeat a Chinese assault on Taiwan? Beijing, it seems, has a strong preference for a short, sharp war that leverages its geographic proximity to the island and exploits Washington’s remoteness from the scene. Washington, therefore, must be able to fight a short, sharp war of its own to stop Beijing from executing a military fait accompli. But both sides cannot achieve rapid decisive battle. The historical record suggests that although many militaries plan to win big and win quickly, great-power conflicts are often protracted affairs characterized by gradual attrition. The extent that the United States is beginning to address these concerns, it is focused on mobilizing its defense-industrial base to carry out a lengthy fight if its initial campaign falls short of expectations. A strategy that calls for smashing Chinese military forces in and around the Taiwan Strait might seem like it offers a straight line to victory, but it could leave the United States poorly positioned for a long fight. Preparing for a long fight, choices are deeply at odds with the contemporary American way of war, which emphasizes massing forces, responding quickly, and destroying the adversary’s frontline military forces in a limited conflict. That seems to leave for Washington one course of action: a defensively oriented, highly lethal denial campaign that would damage or destroy enough enemy forces to prevent China from gaining control over Taiwan in the first place. In short, if United States does not react quickly and forcefully, and if it does not inflict enormous losses on its opponent, Taiwan could fall, particularly as the military balance between the island and the mainland shifts further and further in the latter’s favor. Decisive battle is historically rare, especially if both antagonists are unwilling or unable to inflict the level of destruction necessary to actually knock their opponent down for the count. Given that the United States and China appear to be preparing for limited war (not regime change or unconditional surrender), and have designed their kinetic forces for tailored attacks on military targets (not widespread attacks on war-related industry), a prospective conflict between them is unlikely to be the exception that proves the rule. The theory of victory underpinning a successful campaign of denial does not explain how the destruction of China’s air and maritime forces would be anything other than the first round of a longer fight against a revanchist rival whose military-industrial capacity would remain untouched. And it is equally unlikely that Beijing could or would do enough damage to prevent the United States from rearming and reattacking eventually. A collision between the United States and China would most likely be a drawn-out affair in which neither side is able to gain a decisive advantage quickly, or in which one side gains a temporary advantage that turns out to be the beginning of a much longer fight. That could lead to one of several possible scenarios: of protracted wars over the disposition of Taiwan or a protracted war between the United States and China in which Taiwan, whatever its status, becomes a secondary consideration. The strategic demands associated with confronting multiple rivals in multiple regions exert a heavy influence on defense planners. If the United States no longer has the ability to successfully fight two wars at once, then keeping adversaries in a box might require winning the first war big and winning it fast, so that potential opportunists will remain on guard and on the sidelines. The tenets of rapid decisive battle, which have influenced American military planning for decades and continue to shape how the U.S. military manages the China problem, are directly at odds with the sources of success in a long war. The first principle of protracted war is to survive the initial fight. The quest for rapid decisive battle often goes hand-in-hand with the risk of decisive losses. Success means degrading the sources of an opponent’s military power, including its economic and military-industrial capacity, both at home and abroad. This clashes with the imperative to target frontline forces, especially within a small geographic box like the Taiwan Strait, in pursuit of decisive battle against an opposing military alone. The United States appears to be pursuing a strategy, and designing a force, for a low probability scenario: an invasion of Taiwan that can be halted quickly at the point of attack, and at an acceptable cost, through the destruction of adversary frontline units. This fits well with the American military’s preference for a swift response, overwhelming force, and escalation management, even when it does not play to American strengths. By putting its forces at risk and keeping coercive options off the table, however, those decisions could leave Washington disadvantaged in the type of scenario it is more likely to confront, namely an indecisive conflict that drags on over time and extends far beyond the narrow confines of the Taiwan Strait. Undermining an adversary’s geopolitical and economic position is just as important in protracted war as destroying its frontline forces. For decades, defense officials have sought to keep conflicts geographically constrained and minimize the damage inflicted on non-military targets, even though global force projection - including the ability to strike any target, anywhere in the world - remains an enduring American military advantage. That arguably has left the U.S. military ill-prepared and ill-equipped to degrade a rival’s economic and industrial capacity in a long war. Force preservation becomes increasingly important in protracted war. Washington cannot, then, rush its all of its most valuable assets to the rescue of Taiwan. Policymakers need to consider the range of plausible outcomes that exist in between the unlikely extremes of a quick Chinese capture of Taiwan and a quick U.S. defeat of China, and determine which of those outcomes are actually acceptable. A genuine victory in the most likely conflict scenario - a prolonged, grinding fight - looks quite different from current theories of victory. It leverages different advantages than the current American way of war and it requires far more than a revitalization of the defense-industrial base. (Source: War on the Rocks – U.S.)
by Montgomery, a senior fellow and the director of research and studies at the Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. He previously served as special advisor to the vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff;
Ouellet, a researcher at the Institute for Defense Analyses. He previously served as vice director for Joint Force.
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