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European Parliament
Jan 25, 24 A forecast. The 2024 European Parliament elections will see a major shift to the right in many countries, with populist radical right parties gaining votes and seats across the EU, and centre-left and green parties losing votes and seats. We collected the most recent opinion polls in every EU member state and applied a statistical model of the performance of national parties in previous European Parliament elections, building on a model we developed and used for the 2009, 2014, and 2019 elections. The results show that the two main political groups in the parliament – the European People’s Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) – will likely continue to lose seats which is resulting in an increasing fragmentation of European party systems, at both the national and European levels. We expect the EPP to remain the largest group in the parliament, and therefore maintain most agenda-setting power, including over the choice of the next commission president. Our model predicts significant seat losses for the EPP in Germany, Italy, Romania, and Ireland, but significant gains in Spain. We forecast that the S&D will lose a lot of seats in Germany, and the Netherlands, and will gain most seats in Poland. The “grand coalition” of the EPP and the S&D is set to lose seats, holding 42 per cent of the total, compared to its current 45 per cent. We predict that the centrist Renew Europe (RE) group and the Greens/European Free Alliance (G/EFA) will also lose seats, falling from 101 to 86 and 71 to 61 respectively. We expect RE to lose most seats in France and Spain, and to make most gains in the Czech Republic and Italy and the G/EFA to lose most seats in Germany, France, and Italy. Even with the RE group, the “super grand coalition” of the three centrist groups will only hold 54 per cent of the seats, compared to its current 60 per cent - not enough for these three groups to guarantee a winning majority when they vote together. Almost half the seats will be held by MEPs outside the “super grand coalition” of the three centrist groups. The Left group should increase their representation from 38 to 44 seats - it will make most gains in Germany, France, and Ireland. In addition, if the Five Star Movement in Italy, which we predict will win 13 seats, decided not to sit with the non-attached (NI) MEPs, it may choose to join either the G/EFA or the Left, which would bolster the number of MEPs sitting to the left of the S&D. The left coalition – of the S&D, the G/EFA, and the Left – will lose seats, with 33 per cent of the total, compared to the current 35 per cent. And, even if the left coalition can secure the support of RE – which they have done on environmental and social rights issues during the current term – it would hold only 45 per cent of the seats, compared to 50 per cent in the current parliament. The main winners in the elections will be the populist right. The major winner will be the radical right Identity and Democracy (ID) group, which we expect to gain 40 seats and, with almost 100 MEPs, to emerge as the third largest group in the new parliament. A centre-right coalition – of the EPP, RE, and the ECR – will likely lose some seats, holding 48 per cent instead of the current 49 per cent. A “populist right coalition” – made up of the EPP, the ECR, and ID – will increase their share of the seats from 43 per cent to 49 per cent. The majority of the non-attached MEPs are from extreme right parties, meaning that with their support, majority coalitions could form to the right of RE for the first time in the history of the European Parliament. The “pivotal MEP” in the next parliament is likely to be in the EPP group, rather than in the centrist RE (or previously Liberal) group for the first time. Anti-European populists are likely to top the polls in nine member states (Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Hungary, Italy, the Netherlands, Poland, and Slovakia) and come second or third in a further nine countries (Bulgaria, Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Portugal, Romania, Spain, and Sweden). These results will be particularly significant in several member states which will hold national parliament elections soon after the European Parliament election. We also predict that the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) group will gain 18 seats. Our model predicts that the ECR will lose seats in Poland, and gain most seats in Romania and Spain, in addition to Italy. We expect the ECR to pick up a lot of seats in Italy, as a result of Brothers of Italy (FdI) emerging as one of the largest delegations in the European Parliament (with 27 seats). With the expected fall of Forza Italia to only 7 seats, though, the EPP may approach Brothers of Italy to join their group. And, if Fidesz in Hungary (which we expect to win 14 seats) decides to join the ECR rather than to sit with the non-attached MEPs, the ECR could overtake RE and ID and become the third largest group. It predicts that ID will lose many seats in Italy, with the decline of Lega, but these losses will be offset by significant gains in France, Germany, the Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Bulgaria, and Austria. We expect the ECR and ID groups together to account for 25 per cent of MEPs, and have more seats combined than the EPP or the S&D for the first time. The “EU-critics” on the radical right and radical left will increase dramatically to hold 37 per cent of the seats, compared to 30 per cent in the current parliament. Populist voices, particularly on the radical right, are likely to be louder after the 2024 elections than at any point since the European Parliament was first directly elected in 1979. A populist right coalition of Christian democrats, conservatives, and radical right MEPs could emerge with a majority for the first time. This ‘sharp right turn’ will affect the foreign policy choices that the EU can make, particularly on environmental issues, where the new majority is likely to oppose ambitious EU action to tackle climate change. There is uncertainty regarding which political groups some parties will eventually join. There are two types of uncertain parties: (1) those that are not currently represented in the parliament and are not currently members of a European political party (which would automatically determine their group membership); and (2) those that currently have MEPs but might join a different political group in the next parliament. We have already mentioned the three largest parties in this list: Fidesz from Hungary, Brothers of Italy and the Five Star Movement from Italy. Beyond these, there are 25 other parties whose group membership remains uncertain. Together, we predict that these 28 parties will win 122 seats in June 2024, meaning that the eventual sizes of the groups might be somewhat different from those in our forecast. Most of the uncertain parties are those that will sit to the right of the EPP, in either the ECR, ID, or as non-attached MEPs. The likely “sharp right turn” is unlikely to change as a result of changes to these parties’ current or expected group membership. The sizes of the potential coalitions between the political groups in the chamber will benefit the right. Different coalitions have tended to dominate in different policy areas in 2019-2024: A centrist grand coalition (EPP + S&D, usually also with RE) typically won on budgets, budgetary control, culture and education, economic and monetary affairs, foreign affairs, internal market and consumer protection, legal affairs, and transport and tourism; A centre + left coalition (S&D + RE+ G/EFA + the Left) usually won on civil liberties and justice and home affairs, development, employment and social affairs, environment, and women’s rights and gender equality; A centre + right coalition (EPP + RE + ECR, and sometimes ID) usually won on agriculture and rural development, fisheries, industry and research, and international trade. These coalitions and winning patterns are likely to continue, at least at the start of the next parliamentary term. EU support for Ukraine - the majority in the next European Parliament is likely to back a continuation of the type of financial, logistical, and military aid that Western states have been approving for Kyiv since February 2022. However, there will be a larger number of MEPs (particularly in ID and among the non-attached MEPs) who are more sympathetic towards Russia. Support for Ukraine in the rest of the parliament might also soften as national parties start to respond to the changing opinions of their voters, expressed by their votes in the European Parliament elections. Our analysis suggests two significant shifts in coalition patterns. Firstly, the smaller size of the centrist grand coalition, even with RE support, is likely to mean that it will no longer be as dominant on some policy issues. In particular on economic and monetary affairs and internal market and consumer protection – where the grand coalition has won votes in the current parliament by smaller margins – we could see a significant shift to the right, as the EPP looks to partners to its right rather than to the S&D. Given the Euroscepticism of the ECR and ID, and some national parties in the EPP, we could therefore see majorities in the next parliament in support of more economic, fiscal, and regulatory freedom for member states. This bloc would be likely to vote against proposals from the commission to enforce common rules and instead side with the growing group of national governments – such as those in Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, and Sweden – which are pushing for less interference from Brussels in national economic, fiscal, and regulatory policies. Secondly, the smaller number of MEPs on the left relative to the right means that in several policy areas in which the left has tended to win by small margins, a right-wing majority will now be more likely to win than a left-wing majority. This is likely to be particularly true in two areas – civil liberties and justice and home affairs, and environment – where narrow centre-left majorities may be replaced by a new populist right winning coalition (of EPP + ECR + ID + most non-attached MEPs). On civil liberties and justice and home affairs, this could have major implications for EU migration and asylum policies, where there is likely to be a majority in the European Parliament that supports very restrictive immigration policies and will seek to push the commission to reform the EU’s asylum policy framework to allow more discretion for member states and to limit any sharing of refugee allocations. This new winning majority on civil liberties and justice and home affairs could also have implications for the EU’s efforts to enforce the rule of law. In the current parliament there has been a narrow majority in favour of the EU imposing sanctions (such as withholding budget payments) on member states in which the rule of law is backsliding – in particular in Hungary and Poland. But after June 2024 it is likely to be harder for the centrist and centre-left MEPs (in RE, S&D, G/EFA, the Left, and parts of EPP) to hold the line against the 'continued erosion of democracy, rule of law, and civil liberties' in Hungary and any other member state that might head in that direction. The biggest policy implications of the 2024 European Parliament elections are likely to concern environmental policy. In the current parliament, a centre-left coalition (of S&D, RE, G/EFA, and the Left) has tended to win on environmental policy issues, but many of these votes have been won by very small margins. The significant shift to the right in the new parliament will mean that an ‘anti-climate policy action’ coalition is likely to dominate. This would significantly undermine the EU’s Green Deal framework and the adoption and enforcement of common policies to meet the EU’s net zero targets. Perhaps the best illustration of this is what would have happened if the key vote on the EU’s nature restoration law was held after the 2024 elections. The law forces member states to restore at least 20 per cent of the EU’s land and seas by 2030, with binding targets to restore at least 30 per cent of degraded habitats by 2030, rising to 60 per cent by 2040 and 90 per cent by 2050. The key vote was on 12 July 2023, on a motion by the EPP to reject the commission’s proposal outright. The proposal to reject failed by only 12 votes (312 in favour, 324 against), and the parliament then went on to accept the commission’s proposal, with a series of votes against amendments from the groups on the right to water down the proposed actions. The dramatic increase in the number of MEPs to the right of the EPP is likely to seriously limit the EU’s actions to tackle the climate crisis. The European Parliament elections will not only have implications for politics and policy at the EU level, they will also have an impact on domestic politics in many countries. The European Parliament elections are essentially 27 national elections, and the national debates that take place in the run-up to the June 2024 elections will affect the positions that the heads of state or government feel able to take in the months and years that follow the elections. If political parties campaign on a platform to block certain EU decisions, or the way the citizens in a country have voted in the European Parliament elections is perceived to demand a tougher mandate on immigration, a “no” to further EU enlargement, or a vote against the EU’s Green Deal agenda, this will influence the national governments’ approaches to EU policymaking after the 2024 elections. The 2024 European Parliament election in Austria will come just a few months before the next national election, which is set for autumn 2024. If the two mainstream parties – the centre-right People’s Party of Austria (ÖVP) and the centre-left Social Democratic Party of Austria (SPÖ) – continue to haemorrhage support, the radical right Freedom Party (FPÖ) could convert the success of the anti-system change vote into a national electoral victory. Bulgaria has experienced five parliamentary elections since the beginning of 2021. This level of instability has contributed to the rapid acceleration of the anti-system vote, which the far-right and pro-Russia party, Revival, has greatly benefitted from: it won 14 per cent in the last election in 2023, making it the third largest party. If Revival wins three seats in the European Parliament election, as we predict, it will enter the European Parliament for the first time, gaining institutional legitimacy as Bulgaria’s mainstream parties continue to lose their own legitimacy - after holding its fifth national election in two years, Bulgaria is still nowhere near forming a stable government. In France, the latest government led by President Macron is currently hovering at a 30 per cent approval rating. It will be French voters’ first opportunity to express this disapproval electorally and the first test for the French left after the break-up of the New Ecological and Social People’s Union (NUPES). There is every chance that Le Pen’s radical right National Rally (RN) will win the election. This would set the tone for the 2027 presidential election and could establish Le Pen as the potential next French president. In Germany, the European Parliament election is likely to see the far-right Alternative for Germany (AfD) become the second largest German party in the European Parliament, behind a re-emergent Christian Democratic Union/Christian Social Union (CDU-CSU). The election will also be the first test for the new anti-immigrant radical left Alliance Sahra Wagenknecht (BSW). The next German parliamentary elections will be held in autumn 2025. The continued polarisation of German politics will therefore be a major concern for the centrist parties, and the CDU/CSU will be under pressure to say whether they would be willing to enter a coalition with the AfD. In Italy, the European Parliament election will be the first electoral test for the new government led by prime minister Giorgia Meloni, as well as the new leaders of Forza Italia (led by deputy prime minister Tajani) and the centre-left Democratic Party (PD) led by Schlein. A decisive victory for Meloni’s Brothers of Italy, at the expense of its two coalition partners (Forza Italia and the League), would establish Brothers of Italy as the dominant party on the right in Italy. With voters on the left split between PD, the Five Star Movement, and the centrist parties, it remains to be seen whether these elections can establish a path forward for the left in Italy. In the Netherlands, it is far from certain whether a government will be in place by the time of the European Parliament election or whether the country will be heading towards another national election. Wilders’s (PVV) is set to emerge as the largest Dutch party in the European Parliament, while Omzigt’s New Social Contract (NSC) will win MEPs for the first time. A decisive victory for these two parties could encourage them to form a coalition together. The combined Green-Left (PvdA-Groen Links) list may raise questions about the viability of this alliance going forward. In Poland, the European Parliament election will be an opportunity to see whether Polish voters have sustainably turned away from the populist right Law and Justice party (PiS). We expect PiS to top the poll in Poland in June 2024 with 31 per cent of the votes and the centrist European Coalition (KE) alliance to come second with 24 per cent of the votes, closing the gap between it and PiS even further. The new centrist Third Way (TD) should win MEPs for the first time, further consolidating its position as a key ally of KE in a post-PiS Poland. The radical right is expected taking votes from PiS. In Spain, the European Parliament election will be a referendum on prime minister Pedro Sánchez’s Socialist Party (PSOE) government and the deal Sánchez made with the Catalan nationalists to win the premiership after the July 2023 national election. We expect a significant backlash against Sánchez and his deal, with the centre-right People’s Party (PP) emerging as the clear winner and with the radical right Vox winning 10 per cent of the votes. The new Sumar alliance of the radical left and the greens is set to lose votes. Sweden is likely seeing a further consolidation of support for Andersson’s centre-left Swedish Social Democratic Party (SAP), following its re-emergence as the largest party after the September 2022 national election. The radical right Sweden Democrats (SD) look set to come second in the poll, mainly at the expense of the centre-right Moderata, which is likely to be punished for tacitly supporting Andersson’s minority government. While the parliament is not the most significant EU institution when it comes to foreign policy, the way in which the political groups align after the elections, and the impact that these elections have on national debates in member states, will have significant implications for the European Commission’s and Council’s ability to make foreign policy choices, most notably in implementing the next phase of the European Green Deal. The implications of this vote are far reaching for the geopolitical direction of the European Council and European Commission from 2024 onwards. The next European Parliament can be expected to block legislation necessary to implement the politically difficult next phase of the Green Deal – impacting the EU’s climate sovereignty – and push for a harder line on key issues for other areas of EU sovereignty including migration, enlargement, and support for Ukraine. National governments will feel constrained by the way these elections shape domestic debates, affecting the positions they can take in the European Council. This is likely to bolster the growing axis of governments around the European Council table that are attempting to limit the EU’s influence from within – those of Hungary, Italy, Slovakia, Sweden, and likely a PVV-led government in the Netherlands. These findings should also be set against the expectation that whether or not Trump wins the US presidential election in autumn 2024 – and the polls currently suggest there is a real possibility he will. Europe will have a less globally engaged United States to rely on. This may increase the inclination of anti-establishment and Eurosceptic parties to reject strategic interdependence and a broad range of international partnerships in defence of European interests and values, instead seeking to pursue a more cautious approach to foreign policy decisions.
Note:
Forecast by political group and member state:
Hungary:
Total: 21 (MPPs): EPP: 0; S&D: 4; ID: 0; RE: 1; ECR: 0; G/EFA: 0; Left: 0; NI: 16".
Forecast vote share by member state, 2024:
Party Forecast vote share; Forecast MEPs; Difference Expected; EP group
Fidesz 43.9% 14 1 NI
DK 13.1% 4 0 S&D
MHM 6.2% 2 2 NI
MM 5.8% 1 −1 RE
MKKP 5.0% 0 0 0
MSZP 4.6% 0 −1 0
LMP 3.8% 0 0 0
Jobbik 3.5% 0 −1 0
PM 2.3% 0 0 0
(Parties: Fidesz-Magyar Polgári Szövetség; Demokratikus Koalició; Mi Hazánk Mozgalom; Momentum Mozgalom; Magyar Kétfarkú Kutya Párt; Magyar Szocialista Párt; Lehet Más a Politika; Jobbik Magyarországért Mozgalom; Párbeszéd - A Zöldek Pártja).
(Source: ecfr *)
* European Council on Foreign Relations (Berlin, Germany)
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