Europe
Russia
(Thursday), August 14, 2025 12:20pm EDT Putin praises Trump’s ‘sincere’ peace efforts and signals possible US-Russia nuclear deal. F Today, Putin said on TV that the U.S. was "making, in my opinion, quite energetic and sincere efforts to stop the hostilities, stop the crisis and reach agreements that are of interest to all parties involved in this conflict." The Russian leader also reportedly mentioned possible future "agreements in the area of control over strategic offensive weapons." First US-Russia meeting since 2021 comes as Russia and the U.S. hold the world’s largest nuclear weapons arsenals and have a treaty limiting the number of strategic weapons they may possess, which is set to expire in February, adding more pressure to the upcoming talks. The New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) covers strategic nuclear weapons and caps the number of deployed warheads at 1,550 on each side. There has already been some nuclear tension between the two nations in recent days, as Trump ordered two nuclear submarines to move closer to Russia after the country’s former president made ’highly provocative statements.’ The Kremlin downplayed the move but warned all sides to be "very, very careful" about nuclear rhetoric. Friday’s high-stakes meeting in Anchorage will be the first U.S.-Russia summit since June 2021. It marks a crucial moment for Trump, who has been pushing for an end to the war. Trump has threatened very severe consequences if Putin does not agree to peace with Ukraine, but he has not detailed what that could mean. Zelenskyy, whose relationship with Trump has been rocky, yesterday wrote on X that he saw ’no sign’ that the Russians are preparing to end the war. He has been working to bolster support among some world leaders ahead of the Trump-Putin summit. This week, he met with U.K. Prime Minister Keir Starmer at 10 Downing Street, and he traveled to Belin to meet with German Chancellor Friedrich Merz. Starmer and Merz co-chaired yesterday’s meeting of the ’Coalition of the Willing’ - a gathering of nations that back Ukraine - alongside French President Macron. Vice President Vance and Special Presidential Envoy for Ukraine Gen. Kellogg were also in attendance. (Source: Fox News – U.S.)
by Wolf
Thursday 14 August 2025 17:04 BST Russian President Putin has indicated he wants to pursue a new nuclear weapons agreement with US President Trump, ahead of their anticipated summit in Alaska tomorrow. Moscow views the Ukrainian situation as integral to a complex web of security concerns that have elevated East-West tensions to their highest point since the Cold War. Despite Kyiv's repeated calls for an immediate and comprehensive ceasefire, Mr Putin has resisted. The potential accord is framed by Mr Putin as part of a wider initiative to bolster global peace, coming amid persistent pressure from Mr Trump to de-escalate the three-and-a-half-year conflict in Ukraine. Progress on a new arms control treaty at the summit could allow Mr Putin to present himself as actively engaged in broader peace efforts. This, in turn, might help dissuade Mr Trump from imposing new sanctions on Russia and its key exports, including oil, a measure the US leader has previously threatened. Such a development could also signify a broader push to mend relations with Washington, particularly concerning trade and economic ties, areas the Kremlin believes hold significant untapped potential. Throughout the war, Mr Putin has delivered veiled threats about using nuclear missiles and warned that entering a direct confrontation with Russia could lead to World War Three. They have included verbal statements, war games, and lowering Russia's threshold for using nuclear weapons. According to the Federation of American Scientists, Russia and the United States have estimated military stockpiles of 4,309 and 3,700 nuclear warheads respectively. China trails behind with an estimated 600. The fact that Russia has more nuclear weapons than any other country gives it a stature in this domain that far exceeds its conventional military or economic power, allowing Mr Putin to face Mr Trump as an equal on the world stage when it comes to security. Signed by then-US president Obama and his Russian counterpart Medvedev in 2010, the New START treaty caps the number of strategic nuclear warheads that the United States and Russia can deploy. Each is limited to no more than 1,550, and a maximum of 700 long-range missiles and bombers. Strategic weapons are those designed by each side to hit the enemy's centres of military, economic and political power. The treaty came into force in 2011 and was extended in 2021 for five more years after US President Biden took office. In 2023, Mr Putin suspended Russia's participation but Moscow said it would continue to observe the warhead limits. The treaty expires on 5 February 2026. Security analysts expect both sides to breach the limits if it is not extended or replaced. In a symptom of the underlying tensions, Mr Trump this month said he had ordered two US nuclear submarines to move closer to Russia because of what he called threatening comments by Mr Medvedev about the possibility of war with the US. The Kremlin played down the move but said "everyone should be very, very careful" with nuclear rhetoric. Separately, an arms race looms over shorter- and intermediate-range missiles, which can also carry nuclear warheads. During Mr Trump's first presidency, in 2019, he pulled the US out of a treaty that had abolished all ground-based weapons in this category. Moscow denied his accusations ’that it was cheating’. ’The United States plans to start deploying weapons including SM-6 and Tomahawk missiles, previously placed mainly on ships, as well as new hypersonic missiles, in Germany from 2026’. Russia said this month it no longer observes any restrictions on where it might deploy intermediate-range missiles. (Source: The Independent – United Kingdom)
by Trevelyan
Asia
China
August 14, 2025 What China wants (and fears) from a Trump-Putin Deal? Beijing would prefer to see a frozen Russia-Ukraine conflict and a Moscow less burdened by sanctions. Trump and Putin meet in Alaska this Friday to discuss „ending” the war in Ukraine. Beijing will carefully study every handshake, phrase, and subtle signal that emerges from the talks. For China, such a meeting is about the deeper structure of global order that could emerge afterward and especially whether the outcome will help lock in a Eurasian balance of power favorable to Beijing’s strategic ambitions. Alternatively, an agreement could bind China into a new set of constraints on sanctions enforcement and technology controls, as well as its relationships with key European states. Since February 2022, Xi has walked a narrow political and diplomatic ridge, publicly professing “neutrality” and respect for sovereignty while actively providing Russia with material and technological support. At the same time, Beijing has strengthened what it calls a “no limits” partnership with Moscow. A US-Russia bargain that effectively freezes the frontlines and normalizes some of Russia’s gains would, in most respects, suit Beijing. It would preserve a strategic partner in Eurasia and avoid an outcome in which Moscow is weakened to the point of dependency on the West. Conversely, a deal that ties any ceasefire to tough, enforceable restrictions on Chinese dual-use exports to Russia would be unwelcome. This is why the choreography of the Alaska meeting - who initiates, who concedes, and what details are left vague - matters as much as the headlines. Beijing’s conduct since the start of the war has been guided by three interlocking imperatives. The first is to ensure Russia’s survival as a functioning strategic actor. Moscow remains China’s only peer-level counterweight to Washington across the Eurasian landmass. It is also a vital supplier of discounted energy and raw materials, and a partner in constructing alternatives to a US-centric order. This explains Beijing’s consistent support - through expanded energy trade, dual-use technology exports, and diplomatic cover in international forums - to ensure Russia avoids a humiliating defeat. Xi and Putin have framed their partnership as a civilizational alternative to Western leadership, extending their cooperation well beyond the war into investment, space technology, and cultural exchanges that reinforce a sense of long-term alignment. The second imperative is to erode US primacy without triggering a direct military confrontation. China’s so-called peace proposals, calling for ceasefires, negotiations, and opposition to nuclear threats, are designed to portray Beijing as a responsible global power. Simultaneously, they subtly shift blame toward NATO enlargement and Western ’bloc politics.’ These rhetorical positions are calibrated to resonate with the Global South, where Beijing’s refusal to join sanctions regimes and its economic outreach to Moscow have been noted approvingly. China has also avoided high-profile diplomatic events, such as the peace summit in Switzerland, that might corner Moscow into concessions it does not want to make. In European and transatlantic capitals, this posture has come to be described as strategic neutrality - neutral in name but tilted toward Russia in effect. The third imperative is to preserve Beijing’s diplomatic space in Europe, avoiding a hard, Cold War–style split. China continues to court European leaders and present itself as an indispensable broker for global stability. By keeping open the prospect of participating in Ukraine’s eventual reconstruction, Beijing positions itself as both a pragmatic partner and a player whose cooperation is needed to resolve global crises. This balancing act has produced mixed results: in 2024–25, Xi’s high-profile visits improved dialogue but also deepened suspicion that China is complicit in prolonging the war. The Alaska summit poses both opportunities and risks for Beijing. In the most favorable scenario, the war would be frozen with only loosely enforced conditions. This would consolidate Russian territorial gains, allowing Moscow to remain a strong partner and a distraction for Washington, while lowering the immediate risk of escalation that could disrupt China’s own priorities. Such an outcome might also trigger “sanctions fatigue,” especially in Europe, leading to softer enforcement and more room for Chinese banks and tech firms to operate in Russia. Beijing could even claim an image boost, presenting itself as supportive of renewed U.S.–Russia engagement without altering its policy in any meaningful way. The more dangerous scenario is one in which the Alaska outcome explicitly targets China’s economic lifelines to Russia. Broad secondary sanctions could pressure Chinese financial institutions, logistics providers, and component manufacturers. Tighter enforcement on critical technology exports - such as machine tools, semiconductors, optics, and UAV components - could force Beijing into difficult choices between supporting Russia and safeguarding its own industrial policy. If the deal gains European endorsement and Kyiv’s reluctant cooperation, it could also undermine China’s narrative in the Global South that it is championing peace without Western diktats. In the lead-up to Alaska, Beijing’s public messaging is likely to be supportive of “dialogue” but vague on specifics, reiterating familiar lines about indivisible security and opposition to nuclear escalation. Privately, Xi will use his influence with Putin to urge restraint, keep nuclear threats off the table, and negotiate a ceasefire that eases sanctions without loosening the strategic bond between the two states. Meanwhile, China will continue to expand its sanctions-resistant infrastructure - yuan-ruble settlements, alternative logistics corridors, and networks of intermediary firms - to insulate itself from any enforcement measures that might emerge from the talks. Once the summit concludes, Beijing will adapt its narrative to suit the outcome. If there is a deal, it will claim this validates China’s long-standing advocacy for dialogue. If the talks fail, it will fault Washington’s overreach or Kyiv’s inflexibility, while offering to participate in reconstruction when “wiser heads prevail.” This dual-track narrative helps Beijing finesse its central paradox: insisting on sovereignty and territorial integrity in principle, while enabling Russia’s occupation of Ukrainian territory in practice. By framing any settlement as a temporary stabilization measure, China can defer the sovereignty question indefinitely - a tactic it also applies to Taiwan and disputed areas of the South China Sea. Europe’s response to the Alaska meeting will significantly shape China’s room for maneuver. If the EU treats a ceasefire as an opportunity to “de-risk” but not decouple from China, Beijing can reinvigorate trade diplomacy and resist U.S.-led technology controls. But if European leaders perceive that China has pocketed strategic gains while enabling aggression, they could push for tighter export controls, more rigorous screening of outbound investments, and closer alignment with U.S. sanctions enforcement. From any Trump-Putin bargain, China will try to extract three main benefits. It will seek incremental sanctions relief - enough ambiguity to allow banks, insurers, and shippers to expand higher-value transactions with Russia without fear of sudden reversal. It will value the reduced risk of sudden escalation, freeing Beijing to focus on domestic growth, industrial upgrades, and regional initiatives from the South China Sea to Central Asia. And it will seize the chance to recalibrate relations with key European states such as Germany and France, offering targeted cooperation in green technology and reconstruction that minimizes security concerns while maximizing political goodwill. What Beijing fears most is being explicitly named and targeted in the agreement, losing its role in the geopolitical narrative to a bilateral Trump-Putin “fix,” and seeing the sanctions logic applied to broader US technology controls in Asia. If these risks emerge, China’s response will combine symbolic compliance - publicly tightening controls on a few niche items - with broader defiance, maintaining critical flows through intermediaries and alternative channels. It will also intensify its courtship of Europe, using business delegations, climate cooperation, and reconstruction offers to draw EU preferences away from Washington’s enforcement priorities. Simultaneously, Beijing will double down on its messaging to the Global South, stressing its consistency and contrasting its conduct with what it portrays as Western hypocrisy. For Beijing, Alaska is not about ending the war so much as shaping the next phase of the world order. It wants a United States constrained by multiple commitments, a Russia preserved as a strategic partner, and a Europe kept within reach of Chinese diplomacy. A ceasefire that freezes the front lines, preserves Russian leverage, and leaves China’s support networks intact would mark a quiet but significant victory. A deal that triggers a sanctions crackdown on Chinese banks and suppliers would accelerate the very containment Beijing most fears. Either way, Xi will present China as a consistent and pragmatic power in Eurasia - laying the groundwork for a geopolitical order that will matter long after the Alaska photo opportunity has faded. (Source: The National Interest – U.S.)
By Dr. Yang, a Research Fellow at the Kennedy School of Government at Harvard University, the Founder and President of Citizen Power Initiatives for China and author of For Us, The Living: A Journey to Shine the Light on Truth and It’s Time for a Values-Based “Economic NATO.”
North America
United States
August 15, 2025, 1 PM ET The tiny White House club making major national-security decisions. Trump has pushed out career experts and aides who challenged him. Rubio quickly restructured the NSC, which had grown to more than 300 people in recent years. By late May, 100 staffers had been dismissed and numerous NSC offices had been closed or consolidated. Vance’s aide Baker and Wiles’s aide Gabriel, both of whom were named deputy national security advisers in May, are now key figures in managing the smaller, more streamlined NSC. In addition to the core decision team of Trump, Vance, Rubio, and Wiles, Miller plays a key role on issues related to homeland security. On decisions involving Russia and Israel, envoy Witkoff is included. And on military matters, the president pulls in Hegseth and General Caine, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This time, the principle is that the only things that are done are things specifically directed by the president. (Source: The Atlantic – U.S.)
August 14, 2025 1:50 pm (EST) Presidents Putin and Trump are holding their first bilateral meeting since 2019 with the fate of Ukraine’s war seemingly in the balance. What sort of deal - and Ukrainian territorial concessions - Putin and Trump could agree to at a U.S. air base in Alaska? In recent months Trump has directed more criticism at Putin for increasingly destructive Russian attacks on Ukraine, setting an August deadline for Russia to show commitment to a ceasefire or face harsher sanctions. Russian and U.S. officials agreed to a bilateral summit to try to reach common ground. Their decision to exclude Zelenskyy from the meeting raised alarm in both Kyiv and European capitals. What is considered the most realistic scenario and its consequences for European security at the August 15 summit? Russia is with control of part of the east of the country, including Crimea and much of the Donbas region. The prospects for best, worst, and most likely outcomes: Kupchan: ’The best summit outcome would be if Trump forges a framework agreement with Putin that can earn the support of Ukraine and NATO allies. Following the Alaska summit, Trump would „begin” discussing the deal with Zelenskyy and NATO leaders to build a unified transatlantic position that can then serve as the basis for further negotiations with Russia. Such an agreement would likely have the following elements: A ceasefire in place, potentially including minor land swaps; Neither Ukraine nor the West would recognize the 20 percent of Ukraine occupied by Russia as Russian territory, but they would agree not to attempt to retake it by force; Russia would acknowledge that the 80 percent of Ukraine still controlled by Kyiv is a free, sovereign, and independent country. A free Ukraine would have the right ’to acquire the military capability to defend itself and to choose its future alignment, including European Union membership’; „NATO would no longer aim to offer Ukraine membership and would agree to limit the presence of NATO troops and armaments” in Ukraine; As the agreement is implemented, the United States and its allies would agree to incrementally scale back economic sanctions against Russia. The worst outcome would be Trump agreeing to a flawed deal that is unacceptable to Ukraine and NATO allies. Putin has yet to back away from his maximalist war aims, which include regime change in Kyiv and Ukraine’s demilitarization - effectively turning Ukraine into a vassal state. Were Trump to agree to such a deal in the service of achieving a ceasefire, he would then tell Ukraine to take it or leave it. Ukraine would reject the deal, and Trump could then end all support for Ukraine. The result would be breach in transatlantic relations and, potentially, Putin’s successful subjugation of Ukraine. The state of play after the summit will likely look much like the state of play before the summit.; Russia is making progress on the battlefield, Ukraine is facing manpower and resource constraints and continues to suffer withering air attacks. Putin believes, probably correctly, that time is on his side. He has every reason to buy more time by going through the motions of diplomacy with Trump while continuing the fight, hoping to break Ukraine politically and install a pro-Russian regime. The meeting itself is a prize for the Russian leader - a seat at the table with the U.S. president and an end to years of diplomatic isolation. Let’s hope that in offering Putin that prize, Trump has good reason to believe Putin is ready to compromise. Fix: A summit between Trump and Putin in Alaska - without the presence of Zelenskyy - is itself a victory for the Russian president. ’European’ efforts have focused on finding out what possible peace proposals are actually on the table. The best plausible outcome would be to first push for an unconditional ceasefire, as the starting point for discussions. U.S. officials have already toned down expectations for the summit, framing it as a listening exercise. A good deal would demand ’reciprocity’ in any territorial concessions and establish a roadmap for direct, high-level Russian-Ukrainian talks. Putin could refuse these terms, which would likely result in Trump hardening his stance against Putin. Or he could tentatively agree to them, enabling the West to move forward more united and therefore stronger. Both of these outcomes, while unlikely, are still possible. The worst-case scenario for Europeans would be an agreement between the United States and Russia that is unacceptable to Ukraine and Europe, especially if the United States tries to coerce them into a deal along the lines of Russia’s Istanbul framework proposal. These are the red lines from Europe’s and Ukraine’s point of view: Ukraine’s demilitarization and a stop to Western weapon deliveries; Constitutional reforms; A demand for Ukraine to give up territory in the East - the most fortified part of the frontline - without a reciprocal significant Russian withdrawal from occupied territories, especially if not accompanied by security guarantees; A premature lifting of sanctions that is not linked to tangible progress towards peace; A rollback of the U.S. and NATO presence in Eastern Europe, as demanded by Putin in December 2021; A normalization of U.S.-Russia relations that bypasses Europe and Ukraine. In the aftermath of a worst-case scenario, Europeans and Ukrainians ’could try’ to reverse the agreement or simply to refuse to implement it. „The United States would be seen as turning away from Europe and the West,” in favor of a U.S.-Russia rapprochement. Ukraine would be perceived by Trump as the obstacle to peace, not the victim of aggression. There has been little preparation for this last-minute summit and neither side has clear areas for compromise. Still, a summit that yields no substance would be better than one that pits the United States and Russia together against Europe and Ukraine. The most likely outcome: Trump and Putin will agree to agree - Trump’s favorite instrument in the past, allowing him to produce one-pagers that provide little detail but give the impression of a victory. As he has done before, he may overestimate his abilities, to the detriment of Ukraine. Stares: In Trump’s world, a week can seem like an eternity with his norm-breaking pronouncements and head-spinning U-turns. The past week has been no exception. Exactly seven days after Trump warned Putin that the United States would impose punishing new sanctions and secondary tariffs for having failed to halt the fighting in Ukraine, the two leaders will sit down in Alaska to discuss whether a deal can be reached. At past summits of this kind - certainly those before Trump’s first term - most leaders were expected to do was deliver their talking points and sign off on whatever had already been agreed. Not so with the upcoming Alaska summit. Although the White House is lowering expectations about what to expect from the meeting - now calling it a listening exercise - everything we have come to know about Trump’s penchant for freelancing and going off script whenever he pleases means we should not dismiss a range of possible outcomes. The least likely is the best-case outcome: both leaders call for an immediate ceasefire and commit to meaningful peace negotiations. Setting out some basic principles and parameters for how to proceed in the form of an initial framework agreement or roadmap would also be welcome. Ideally, Trump would have listened closely to what Ukrainian and European leaders told him about their red lines in the consultations they held before the summit - not the least being that no deal with Putin should be struck, or can be expected to stick, without their approval. If this scenario plays out - and it’s a big and improbable if - there’s no reason why a truce could not take immediate effect and peace talks between Russia and Ukraine - with or without U.S.participation - commence soon after. The worst-case scenario: The summit quickly dissolves into rancorous exchanges and a dangerous rupture in U.S.-Russia relations ensues. ’Some observers might perversely welcome this result’ in the expectation that the United States would thereafter decisively commit to Ukraine’s victory by finally ’removing all limits on supplying it with the necessary military aid’ while imposing much harsher economic sanctions on Russia. How confident can anyone be that additional U.S. military aid and economic sanctions would have the desired effect? How much more human suffering would ensue if the war drags on, not to mention a return to Cold War levels of great power confrontation? Such a reaction from Trump, however, is hardly assured; he could just as easily wash his hands of trying to make peace and leave Ukrainians and Europeans to their fate. Somewhere in the middle of the range of possible outcomes is probably the most likely - no real progress toward ending the war but no significant setback either. A temporary suspension of attacks on urban centers (but not on the front lines) might even be floated as a good faith commitment to peace. This would cost Putin little. And Trump could claim he got something from Putin. Both sides will claim that the talks were candid and productive. (Source: The Council on Foreign Relations – U.S.)
by Kupchan, a senior fellow at the CFR and professor of international affairs at Georgetown University; Fix, a fellow for Europe, and Stares,who is the John W. Vessey senior fellow for conflict prevention and director of the Center for Preventive Action.
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