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Denmark
December 10, 2025 The US has for the first time described as a potential security risk amid geopolitical frictions over Greenland, according to Denmark's 2025 intelligence outlook published today. The US president has not ruled out taking the Arctic island, a territory of the Danish kingdom, using military force. Still, Russia and China are viewed as the main risks. Uncertainty about the US’ role as a guarantor of Europe’s security will increase Russia’s willingness to intensify its hybrid attacks against the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, while China’s use of economic and military leverage continues to challenge Western influence, it said. ’The Baltic Sea region is the area where there is the greatest risk that Russia will use military force against NATO,’ the agency said. (Source: Bloomberg - U.S.)
European Union
December 10, 2025 The European Union considered China a systemic rival in 2019. The bloc no longer seeks full decoupling, but aims to reduce exposure in sectors deemed strategic for security and competitiveness. Europe has cut its dependence on Russian gas. It has at the same time become equally reliant on Chinese goods that are essential for the continent’s lofty environmental and technological goals. China dominates the global production and processing of solar photovoltaic (PV) components, rare earth elements (REEs), permanent magnets and advanced battery materials such as graphite and lithium compounds. In several stages of these value chains, Chinese producers control 80 percent or more of global capacity. This concentration creates a new type of strategic vulnerability in the supply of critical technologies. A disruption in Chinese exports of magnets, PV wafers or battery chemicals could delay renewable-energy deployment, electric vehicle (EV) production and power-grid upgrades. Even short interruptions reverberate through prices, investment timelines and industrial output. Europe’s exposure to China is deepest where its ambitions are highest. Trade tensions have added a political dimension. Beijing has tightened export-licensing requirements for certain grades of graphite and REE magnets, signaling that it is willing to weaponize its market share. Brussels is responding through the Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which seeks to build mining, refining and recycling capacity within the EU; but such projects take years to mature. Europe’s strategic dilemma: to accelerate decarbonization while reducing reliance on the Chinese supply chains that enable it. Failure could leave the continent facing another energy crisis – this time rooted in processing plants and export licenses. Four sectors illustrate Europe’s vulnerability to China that underpin the EU’s clean-energy transition: Rare earth elements and magnets; Solar photovoltaics; Magnesium, and Batteries. Rare earth elements are indispensable for EV motors, wind-turbine generators and defense technologies. For heavy rare earth elements, the EU’s reliance on China is close to 100 percent. China dominates the refining and magnet-making stages of the supply chain. The EU is highly import-dependent on China for permanent magnets. When Beijing tightened export-licensing scrutiny for high performance magnets in 2025, European manufacturers considered it a warning shot. The CRMA sets diversification targets for 2030, yet meaningful refining and magnet capacity in Europe remains more distant. Solar photovoltaics: Chinese firms now control over 80 percent of global PV manufacturing capacity, from polysilicon to finished modules. More than 90 percent of the solar panels installed in Europe originate from China, following the collapse of the EU’s own solar industry in the early 2010s. The paradox: Europe’s flagship climate technology depends on a single foreign supplier. Any trade restriction or logistics shock could delay installations and inflate project costs, undermining the bloc’s climate targets. Magnesium is the lightest of all commonly used structural materials and one that is crucial for lightweight aluminum alloys. 95-96 percent of EU magnesium imports come from China. Efforts to restart smelting in Romania, France and Norway face high energy costs and lengthy permitting processes. In 2021, China briefly cut its magnesium output so that it could reduce its domestic energy consumption, causing immediate price spikes and supply shortages globally. This threatened Europe’s automotive and packaging industries. Batteries and critical minerals: China refines around 60-70 percent of global lithium and cobalt and about 90 percent of natural graphite, including almost all of the spherical graphite used in battery anodes. Partnerships with Australia, Canada and other allied suppliers are growing, but lternative refining and processing capacity is unlikely to satisfy Europe’s projected demand before the end of this decade. The immediate strategic exposure and risk lie in clean-energy and industrial materials. These inputs are directly linked to Europe’s power systems, transport and manufacturing competitiveness – the same areas that proved most vulnerable during the Russian gas crises. Solar modules, magnets, magnesium and battery materials together form a new axis of dependency – a European energy transition built on foreign foundations. Europe lacks stockpiles and domestic refining capacity. Any Chinese export pause – intentional or accidental – would transmit instantly through supply chains. Several well-defined transmission channels could rapidly turn a disruption in critical materials into broader economic stress. This crisis would propagate through manufacturing bottlenecks, investment delays and price volatility. Even minor slowdowns could idle European production lines for EV motors or wind-turbine generators. The EU’s anti-subsidy investigation into Chinese EVs and Beijing’s counter-probes into European agricultural exports marked a new phase of politicized trade. If China were to impose duties or quotas on PV modules, magnets or battery materials, project costs would surge and installation timetables would slip, forcing governments to revise their climate-energy trajectories. European tariffs on Chinese goods would raise input prices for the bloc’s own green industries, amplifying inflationary pressures. Even without formal restrictions, disruptions in shipping, insurance or foreign exchange markets could put supply chains under pressure. A geopolitical flare-up in the South China Sea or around Taiwan would reroute maritime trade and lift freight rates. Most of Europe’s energy-transition hardware travels by sea. A few weeks of port congestion or renminbi appreciation could add billions to project budgets. Downstream sectors – utilities, carmakers and construction firms – operate on tight investment cycles. A sudden shortage of PV modules or battery cells would defer revenues, unsettle balance sheets, dampen investor confidence. Even modest delivery delays can translate into market-value losses, feeding through to credit conditions and public budgets. Taken together these factors: Europe’s vulnerability has shifted from energy consumption to energy technology. Supply shocks in Chinese clean-tech exports could freeze the energy transition itself. The likely scenario: Europe continues its current course: cautious diversification under the banner of de-risking while maintaining pragmatic trade with China. Chinese producers remain dominant in solar PVs, battery materials and magnets. Supply tensions persist but remain manageable through inventories and flexible contracting. Political pressure for sovereignty fades as economic growth takes precedence. The energy transition proceeds, but the underlying exposure remains: a stable dependence rather than genuine autonomy. „The likelihood of this scenario is 60 percent’. Somewhat likely: Escalating disputes over EV tariffs or technology transfers trigger a cycle of retaliation. Beijing slows export approvals for graphite and rare-earth magnets; Brussels raises barriers on Chinese clean-tech imports. Project costs rise, renewable-energy build-outs stall and Europe again confronts supply-driven inflation reminiscent of 2022. Governments then scramble to subsidize domestic production, fragmenting Europe’s single market. Utilities and automakers delay investment, and the EU’s climate goals slip further out of reach. The crisis is as political as it is economic: Europe proves unable to reconcile its environmental ambition with its geopolitical vulnerability. ’The likelihood of this scenario is 15 percent’. Possible: Repeated supply shocks, geopolitical headwinds and rising costs push Europe toward a strategic rethink enabling a continued drive toward clean energy via nuclear power. Ambitious goals for solar and wind power, as well as the switch from combustion engines to EVs, are abandoned. Today several European states join the nuclear power revival as a route to energy autonomy and industrial stability. The British and the Czechs are moving from design to implementation of small modular reactors [SMRs]. Slovakia is choosing Westinghouse for nuclear fuel supplies, Prague is selecting South Korea’s nuclear power firm for new large reactors at legacy power plants. France accelerates its development of SMRs with Croatia and Italy pursuing similar options. Sweden reverses course and allows nuclear power, Poland and Finland partner with U.S. and South Korean suppliers. Even Germany sets new conditions under which it will gradually restart its nuclear plants. The shift ensures long-term, low-carbon baseline energy generation and reduces reliance on Chinese clean-tech inputs to Europe, reducing its carbon footprint and that renewables alone can ensure energy security. Although it slows the expansion of solar and wind capacity and sidelines the drive for EVs in the short term, this scenario offers greater long-term stability, cost predictability and geopolitical control. This approach could ultimately strengthen both Europe’s industrial base and its strategic autonomy. ’The likelihood of this scenario is 25 percent”. (Source: Geopolitical Intelligence Services AG - Liechtenstein)
by Israel, a professor of economics at the Université Catholique de l’Ouest (UCO) in France.
Ukraine
December 10, 2025 4:58 pm CET 'Zelenskyy teases wartime election to disarm attacks from Trump and Putin'. 'I am ready for the elections. I’ve heard that I’m personally holding on to the president’s seat, that I’m clinging to it, and that this is supposedly why the war is not ending - this, frankly, is a completely absurd story,' he told several journalists via a WhatsApp audio message late yesterday. Zelenskyy’s closest competitor is former Ukrainian army commander Zaluzhnyi, who currently serves as Kyiv’s ambassador to the U.K. (Source: Politico - U.S.)
United Kingdom
10 December 2023 In February, the government said it wanted to classify 11 synthetic opioids as Class A drugs. Last month, the Home Office published an updated list, adding four more. Following a sudden spike in UK deaths this summer, the government put out a warning across the NHS and drug services - the second National Patient Safety Alert in three years. Super-strength street drugs more powerful than heroin have been linked to at least 54 deaths in the UK in the last six months. The true total could be higher - the National Crime Agency (NCA) said 40 more cases awaited further testing. Experts say the new drugs can be stronger than both heroin and fentanyl, another synthetic opioid, which is a leading killer in the US - contributing to 75,000 deaths last year. The deaths are all linked to synthetic opioids called nitazenes, which experts fear are being manufactured in labs and then imported into the UK from China. Nitazenes were first developed in the 1950s as a pain-killing medication but are so potent and addictive they have never been approved for medical or therapeutic use. Injected, inhaled or swallowed, mixing them with other drugs and alcohol is extremely dangerous and significantly increases the risk of overdose and death. Nitazenes first made news in the UK in 2021, when an 18-year-old patient was treated for a non-fatal overdose. Yates, National Crime Agency (NCA) deputy director, said he did not believe there was currently a direct link between the availability of nitazenes and the ban of harvesting opium poppies in Afghanistan, which some have suggested. The NCA believes nitazenes are being produced in illicit labs in China and often enter the UK in the ’post’. In most cases, it is then mixed with heroin by organised gangs, strengthening the drugs being sold on the street. There are an average of 42 drug poisoning deaths each week involving opiates - such as heroin, oxycodone and fentanyl - across England and Wales, latest official figures suggest. Signs that someone may have taken one of Synthetic opioids: Small, narrowed pupils; Reduced or loss of consciousness; Dizziness or drowsiness; Difficulty breathing; Nausea or vomiting; Cold or clammy skin; Blue or grey lips and fingernails; Low blood pressure or decreased heart rate. Anyone who has consumed synthetic opioids and experiences the symptoms described should seek urgent medical treatment. Dr Varney said drug users had no sense of the strength of nitazenes. He warned nitazenes could cause ’a global drug problem’. (Source: BBC - United Kingdom)
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