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Africa
Democratic Republic of Congo
April 15, 2025 Act or watch? The Democratic Republic of the Congo is offering the United States significant mining rights in exchange for military support. In February 2025, President Tshisekedi wrote to President Trump asking for help pushing back the M23 rebel group. It is using access to cobalt, copper and lithium as leverage. The DRC hosts more than 1,100 different minerals and precious metals – including tin, tungsten and tantalum – and is also the world's fourth-largest diamond producer. The country holds an estimated $24 trillion in untapped mineral wealth. It produced 244,000 tonnes of cobalt in 2024, almost 80% of the global supply. The deal could help Kinshasa reduce its dependence on China. Officials in Washington have signalled a willingness to consider multibillion-dollar investment in return. The discussions form part of a broader push to secure new supplies of battery metals as demand for electric vehicles and energy infrastructure accelerates. US support in the DRC has primarily taken the form of traditional development aid, focusing on health and education rather than strategic commercial engagement. They have done little to advance trade, investment or mineral security goals. The Export-Import Bank of the US (EXIM) offers no coverage for the DRC. The Development Finance Corporation (DFC), Washington's development finance institution, has focused narrowly on the Lobito Corridor. China has a dominant interest in the DRC's mining sector. Over the past two decades, China has seized the opportunity to fill the vacuum left by American absence from the country. The landmark 2007 Sicomines deal – a resource-for-infrastructure agreement – granted Chinese companies access to copper and cobalt in exchange for a $3bn infrastructure commitment. The deposits near Kolwezi – one of the DRC's most important mining regions in the south of the country – are estimated to be worth around $93bn. China's dominance was further cemented in 2016 when US-based Freeport-McMoRan sold its majority stake in Tenke Fungurume (TFM) – the world’s largest cobalt mine and seventh-largest copper mine – to China Molybdenum Company (CMOC). Freeport, heavily indebted following misjudged oil and gas acquisitions before the 2014 price crash, announced the $2.65bn sale in May 2016. Canadian firm Lundin Mining, which held a 24% stake, declined its right of first refusal. CMOC stepped in, backed by $1.59bn in financing from six Chinese banks, including state-owned giants such as the Bank of China and China Development Bank. It then facilitated the purchase of Lundin's stake by Hong Kong-based BHR, which used $700mn in Chinese bank financing. CMOC later took over BHR's interest, securing 80% control of TFM. Gécamines, the DRC's state miner, retained 20%. Chinese state-owned banks financed $2.48bn of the $2.68bn in credit used for the TFM deal (adjusted to 2021 prices). Washington’s failure to contest the TFM sale is arguably the most significant commercial misstep it has made in Africa. Today, China owns or holds stakes in 15 of the DRC's largest copper and cobalt mines. Glencore, the country's last major Western mining investor, is reportedly weighing the sale of its $6.8bn Mutanda and Kamoto operation – raising the prospect of another strategic asset falling into Chinese hands. The most significant Chinese mining projects include the Kamoa-Kakula copper project, Tenke Fungurume mine and Kamoto copper. The Kamoa-Kakula copper project is owned by a joint venture comprising Ivanhoe Mines (39.6%), Zijin Mining Group (39.6%), Crystal River Global (0.8%) and the DRC government (20%). The project is among the world's most significant undeveloped high-grade copper discoveries, with measured resources of 90mn tonnes at 3.13% copper and probable mineral reserves of 235mn tonnes. The mine started producing concentrates in May 2021, with commercial production beginning in July 2021. It is being advanced through a phased approach, with peak production estimated at 800,000 tpy. This would make the project the second-biggest copper complex globally. The Tenke Fungurume mine is a copper-cobalt project owned by Chinese private holding company CMOC (80%) and Gécamines (20%). CMOC acquired controlling interests in the mine in 2017 in a $3bn transaction, and in August 2021 it announced plans to double production with a $2.51bn investment. The investments will raise output from 183,000 tpy of copper to 383,000 tpy, and from 15,400 tpy of cobalt to 32,400 tpy, bringing total mineral production to 415,400 tpy. It is the world’s second-largest cobalt mine. The Kamoto Copper Company (KCC) is owned by a joint venture comprising Glencore (75%), Gécamines (20%) and Simco (5%). It is the largest active cobalt mine in the world. KCC owns two open-cast mines (KOV and Mashamba East), one underground mine (Kamoto concentrator) and the Luili refinery in Kolwezi. KCC targets an annual nameplate capacity of 300,000 tonnes of copper and 30,000 tonnes of cobalt. Much of the mineral production is concentrated in the southern provinces of Haut-Katanga and Lualaba, where established industrial operations operate alongside thousands of artisanal miners. The country was attracting more than $130mn in exploration investment in 2024. In the same year, it secured $1.8bn in foreign direct investment (FDI). Vast areas remain underdeveloped, particularly in the east, where insecurity, poor roads and overlapping concessions deter formal investment. North Kivu and Ituri are thought to hold significant untapped reserves. Cobalt is essential to lithium-ion batteries in electric vehicles (EVs), while copper underpins power grids, electric motors and charging infrastructure. By 2030, global cobalt demand is expected to double and the DRC is forecast to contribute 44% of the supply growth. Lithium and tantalum – of which the DRC is also a leading producer – are critical to semiconductors, smartphones and defence applications. Kinshasa faces increasing pressure to scale up production, strengthen governance and broaden its investor base beyond Chinese state-backed operators. The DRC dominates global cobalt reserves, holding 6mn tonnes out of a total of 11mn tonnes worldwide. Two other mines Mutanda and Kamoto also hold significant reserves. Australia and Indonesia follow with 1.7mn tonnes and 500,000 tonnes respectively. In copper, the DRC’s ore bodies grades exceed 2.5%, more than four times the global average and eight times higher than at Morenci, the largest copper mine in the US. The DRC is dubbed 'the Saudi Arabia of electric vehicle age'. The global thirst for copper is expected to jump by 20% by 2035. The country also has vast coltan reserves and is a significant, though underdeveloped, source of lithium. Manono-Kitolo, in the southern province of Tanganyika, is believed by some to be the world’s largest lithium deposit. It contains an estimated 120mn tonnes of lithium ore grading 0.6%, yielding around 720,000 tonnes of lithium. The project remains stalled due to a dispute between China’s Zijin Mining and Australia’s AVZ Minerals. In the country's eastern areas armed groups have disrupted mining zones. As of April 2025, the DRC is battling its most serious escalation of violence in years, with the M23 rebel group launching a renewed and highly coordinated offensive in the east. Since January, the group has overrun large parts of North and South Kivu, seizing control of strategic cities including Goma and Bukavu. The offensive has killed an estimated 7,000 people and displaced more than 450,000. M23, composed mainly of Congolese Tutsi fighters, as intercepted communications suggest, is receiving direct military support from Rwanda – including the deployment of an estimated 4,000 Rwandan troops. The DRC accuses Rwanda of seeking control over key mineral zones, including coltan, gold and cobalt areas. President Tshisekedi has turned to Washington. The move highlights Kinshasa's effort to shift away from reliance on Chinese and Rwandan-backed operators in the mining sector. Peace talks in Doha between Kinshasa and M23 have stalled. The conflict could spill across borders and further destabilise the Great Lakes region. American firms have remained marginal players in the Congolese mining sector. At the start of December 2024 President Biden visited Angola to promote the Lobito Corridor – a $4bn rail and port project aimed at channelling copper and cobalt from central Africa – including the DRC – to global markets through the Port of Lobito, the Angola harbour located on the Atlantic Ocean. The corridor is a strategic alternative to Chinese-dominated logistics. An additional $600mn in funding was pledged during Biden’s visit, and US diplomats confirmed in April 2025 that financing remains on track. The goal is to streamline mineral exports from Zambia and southern DRC, improving transparency and making the region more attractive to Western investors. If successful, the corridor could shift trade patterns and reduce reliance on routes controlled by state-linked Chinese companies. It is unclear whether the Trump administration will back the project. Trump’s Africa advisers have favoured more direct exchanges – military or diplomatic support in return for resource access – and Tshisekedi’s proposal appears to follow that logic. The president's advisers have openly framed resource access as a foreign policy priority, particularly in countries where traditional development models have struggled. The Congolese side is pressing for clear timelines and deliverables. China has also announced plans to invest $1.4bn in the ageing railway that links Dar es Salaam in Tanzania with Zambia's Copperbelt. The investment was unveiled on 20 March 2025 during the Zambia International Mining and Energy Conference. Under a trilateral deal with Tanzania and Zambia, the China Civil Engineering Construction Corporation (CCECC) will rehabilitate the 1,860-km TAZARA line over three years and operate it for 30 years. The agreement includes $1bn for infrastructure upgrades and $400mn for new rolling stock, including 32 locomotives and 762 wagons. Originally built with Chinese support in the 1970s to bypass white-ruled southern Africa, the TAZARA line remains a strategic outlet for Zambian copper exports via the Indian Ocean. It terminates at Kapiri Mposhi, connecting with Zambia's north-south rail grid and facilitating indirect freight access to the DRC. However, there is no dedicated spur from TAZARA into the DRC, and the upgraded route is not expected to extend across the border, the line passes within the logistical range of the DRC frontier. American companies remain cautious about operating in volatile jurisdictions without guarantees. Political risk insurance, development finance backing and credit support are likely prerequisites. Adesina, the co-founder and president of Sabi, a Nigerian company that connects African small-scale and artisanal miners with global buyers, said in a recent article in Semafor that the real opportunity lies in working with artisanal and small-scale miners in Africa, who play a crucial role in the global critical minerals supply chain. In the DRC, such small-scale operations contribute up to 30% of the world's cobalt supply. "Across the continent, two-thirds of lithium supplies come from small-scale miners, as does 60% of the global supply of tantalum, he writes. „The work of these operators could be boosted through targeted investment, transparent logistics and predictable payment structures that meet US regulatory and technical standards." He adds that The US government can help by establishing direct purchasing relationships and deploying financing and technical assistance. (Source: bne IntelliNews - Germany)
Asia
China
April 18, 2025 The trade war worsens. Which is a really powerful form of geopolitical currency? China processes almost all the world’s rare earths, a group of 17 metals used in a wide array of products in the defense, health-care and technology sectors. But as part of its retaliation against escalating U.S. tariffs, Beijing this month restricted the export of several rare earth minerals, raising the risk that U.S. industries will face shortages. Many in Washington have focused on how the new Chinese regulations will affect the U.S. military products like missiles and drones. Beijing has banned the export of critical minerals used in the defense industry — but also for some cancer treatments and MRI exams. Critical rare earths have properties like heat resistance and magnetism that make them useful components of advanced technologies. China dominates the global supply chain because of its processing capability: About 90 percent of refined rare earths came from China in 2023. The second countries start to have disruptions to medical services or medical supplies, particularly for things like cancer care. China deploys carrots and sticks to persuade countries in Asia and Africa to take its side in the superpower standoff. Even if rare earths are mined in other countries, the materials are often sent to China for refining, according to Mei a senior researcher at the Chinese Academy of International Trade and Economic Cooperation, which is affiliated with the Ministry of Commerce. Beijing has used this dominance for political purposes before. It blocked critical mineral exports to Japan in 2010 after a territorial dispute. It also banned exports to the United States of three critical metals - gallium, germanium and antimony, which are important components of electronics, fiber optics or semiconductors - last year after the Biden administration tightened China’s access to advanced technology. This month, Beijing imposed export restrictions on seven more rare earths, including gadolinium and yttrium, citing their dual use nature, meaning that the materials have both civilian and military applications. This applies to shipments globally, not just to the United States. Companies will now be required to apply for permission to export the metals from China, which could take up to 45 days, according to the Commerce Ministry. Curbing exports of rare earths, Mei said, is a targeted strategy to bring Trump to the negotiating table, “minimizing the impact on the economy and population of our trading partners.” Some worry that the impact won’t be minimal. Rare earths are a critical not only for diagnostics but also treatment. Americans suffering from brain tumors, liver cancer and heart attacks may find their medical care disrupted. The U.S. imports a large - and increasing - swath of Chinese medical goods, including antibiotics, pain relievers and bandages, as well as precursor chemicals required to make finished drugs. Chinese pharmaceutical exports to the United States grew 11 percent in 2024 to reach $19 billion. Trump pledged to implement tariffs on foreign-made pharmaceuticals. Gadolinium is used to produce a contrast fluid that is injected into some patients before MRI exams. The fluid helps doctors more easily diagnose brain tumors. It’s a very important agent to enhance contrast for MRI. There are no direct alternatives. The global biotech industry is following the new Chinese regulations closely. Bayer, a German pharmaceutical company that sells a contrast solution, said it is actively monitoring the situation. While the firm’s gadolinium originates in China, Bayer “utilizes a diverse network of suppliers of gadolinium around the world” and doesn’t expect “any immediate impact related to contrast supply for U.S. customers and patients” based on its current supply. Other rare earths on China’s restriction list, including lutetium and yttrium, are used in cancer drugs called radiopharmaceuticals and medical tools like lasers that shrink lung tumors. From 2020 to 2023, 93 percent of U.S. imports of yttrium compounds came from China. It has recently invested in expanding its radiopharmaceutical manufacturing. A subsidiary of the state-owned China National Nuclear Corp. unveiled a large production base in southwestern Sichuan in December, aimed at producing lutetium-based drugs for breast cancer and prostate cancer treatment, according to a company news release. It remains unclear exactly how the new regulations will filter into U.S. health-care supply chains. Some Chinese exporters are already feeling the change since the April 4 restrictions. Shanghai-based Greenearth Chemicals, which exports rare earth materials including gadolinium and yttrium for medical applications, had stopped all exports after the policy change. New Radiomedicine Technology, a company in Chengdu that is developing pharmaceuticals using rare earths, said it hadn’t begun exporting yet but selling overseas would now be impossible with the regulations. China’s export control authorities will fully consider the humanitarian needs of American patients, said Mei. China Nonferrous Metals Industry Association, an industry group, said in an April 6 statement that the export controls “will not affect regular business activities or normal corporate operation and trade.” Chinese suppliers will continue to strengthen the win-win cooperation with friendly countries, it said, unless the trading partner is engaged in activities that harm China’s national sovereignty, security and development interests. (Source: The Washington Post - U.S.)
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