.
Europe
France
20.01.2025 French Prime Minister Francois Bayrou warned today that France and the EU could be crushed if they fail to react to the policies announced by US President-elect Trump, who will be sworn in later today. The United States has decided on an incredibly dominating policy through the dollar, through industrial policy, through the capture of all research and the capture of investments, Bayrou said. "If we do nothing, we will be dominated, crushed, marginalized," he added. He highlighted China's trade surplus exceeding $1 trillion in December, stressing the need for coordinated action. "France and Europe are today facing two challenges, American and Chinese policies," he said. France and Europe cannot remain passive in the face of these challenges, he added. (Source: Anadolu Agency - Turkey)
Germany
Jan 19 2025 It makes sense to hypothesize the war’s possible outcomes and risks, as well as its consequences for Germany and Europe. Three possible scenarios: 1. Russia wins the war. 2. Ukraine wins the war. 3. Nobody wins and the conflict then remains in an unstable stalemate. The first scenario is unlikely but entails a high risk for Germany and Europe. The second scenario is less unlikely but is also associated with a high risk due to the potential use of tactical nuclear weapons. The third scenario is more likely and presents a comparatively lower, nonetheless sensible risk. Conclusions: Germany has - apart from its muddling through approach practiced until now - various security policy options depending on the outcome of the war in Ukraine: 1. The completion of a fully integrated EU defense, economic and financial union. 2. The assumption of a quasi-hegemonic leadership role as the primary American mainland sword in Europe. 3. The assumption of a strong nationalist role in Europe. 4. The formation of a European Caucus within NATO and close security policy cooperation between NATO and the EU. So far, the political will and the corresponding framework conditions have been lacking. The only exception is the right-wing AFD (Alternative for Germany) who wants to leave NATO and the EU as well as to stop the sanctions against Russia. While the AFD is clearly striving for the third option, Social Democrats lean more toward the fourth, the Greens to the first and Christian Democrats to the second option. The outcome of the war in Ukraine will have a decisive impact on German and European security. The possibility of a Russian victory would entail high security risks for Germany and Europe and would have far-reaching negative consequences for Ukraine and the stability of the continent. It should, therefore, absolutely be prevented. A Ukrainian victory may be desirable, but it is associated with a high risk of nuclear escalation, which could lead to the destruction of Ukraine, or even Europe. A stalemate would probably result in a new 'Cold War', which, at best, could be transformed into a 'Cold Peace” in the form of non-violent competition between systems. At worst, it would mean permanent tensions and the threat of war in the sense of a constant struggle for the right order. There are three common truths when dealing with European security: One is that Russia remains a relevant Eastern European neighbor for Germany and the EU in terms of geography and potential. The USA will remain an indispensable player in European security for the foreseeable future, also during the second term of Trump. Germany and Europe thus have an interest in appropriate US involvement in and for Europe. China plays a significant role in this conflict. In the event of a Russian victory China could feel encouraged to use force to achieve its goals concerning Taiwan. A Russian defeat would compromise Chinese ambitions and allow the US to focus on Beijing. That is why China has no interest in a defeated Russia. A stalemate in the Ukraine war, leading to a stable armistice, would tie the US to Europe and enable Beijing to play the role of mediator, whose influence in Europe and Russia would increase. Regardless of the scenario, 'Berlin will have to spend more on its own and EU defense'. The more the US involvement in Europe decreases, the greater the German and European defense burden will be. 'In the current election campaign parties from the political center are competing with tough announcements on higher defense expenditures going from more than 2 percent of GDP (Christian Democrats, Social Democrats) to 3 percent (Christian Social Union) to 3.5 percent (Greens)'. 'Germany’s share of the support costs for Ukraine is likely to increase' although it is already the biggest European supporter in terms of total bilateral allocations. At the same time, Berlin must advance the European integration project and contribute to the economic and political stabilization of Eastern Europe. This is expected to lead to increased national budget conflicts and social tensions in Germany which could favor extremist parties. In order to minimize such conflicts, "possibilities for peaceful coexistence" with an 'imperialist' Russia must be explored. A victorious peace is unlikely for any of the protagonists. The costs of war are constantly rising not only for the direct opponents of the war but also for their supporters and the not-inconsiderable number of states that are staying out. Berlin should strive for a settlement along the lines of the third scenario. This combines a territorial compromise acceptable to both opponents with the maintenance of Ukraine’s legal position and postpones a final settlement to the future. While being staunch supporters of a Ukraine victory, the parties of the political center have started to realize the new realities, however, do not yet draw the respective conclusions. The parties from the extreme left and right spectrum are already arguing in the direction of the third scenario but they have a negative concept of both pillars of European stability, NATO und EU, and 'a naïve view of the aggressor Russia'. NATO is there to keep the Russians out, the Americans in and the Germans involved. Sufficient defense capability and détente can enable security between system opponents. After all, Russia will not disappear from the scene and will one day be interested in co-operation again. Berlin should be careful not to grow into a hegemonic role in the long run because this could entice conflict and the build-up of counter-alliances. This means staying engaged in the European project and investing in European integration more than ever. (Source: E-International Relations - United Kingdom)
by Dr. Ehrhart, a Senior Research Fellow of the Institute for Peace Research and Security Policy at the University of Hamburg (IFSH). He has held visiting research appointments at the Research Institute of the Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Bonn, the Fundation pour les Etudes de Défense Nationale, Paris, the Centre of International Relations at Queen’s University, Kingston, Canada, and the EU Institute for Security Studies, Paris.
Poland
15.01.2025 'Russia plotted attacks on airlines globally, claims Polish premier'. 'I can confirm that Russia planned act sof air terror, not just against Poland but against airlines globally,' Donald Tusk says following meeting with President Zelenskyy in Warsaw. (Source: Anadolu Agency - Turkey)
15 January 2025, 13:04 In 1943-44, Ukrainian nationalists massacred about 100,000 Poles in Volhynia and other regions that were then in eastern Poland, then under Nazi German occupation, and which are now part of Ukraine. Entire villages were burned down and their inhabitants killed by the nationalists and their helpers who were seeking to establish an independent Ukraine state. Poland considers the events a genocide and has been asking Ukraine to let them exhume the victims to give them proper burials. Some of the Second World War-era Ukrainian nationalists are today regarded as national heroes because of their struggle for Ukraine’s statehood. A non-governmental organisation, the Freedom and Democracy Foundation, said on Monday that it would begin exhumation work on victims in Ukraine in April. Kyiv has something to gain from allowing the exhumations. Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk has vowed to use his country’s presidency of the European Union to push forward with Ukraine’s bid for membership. Tusk has been working for some time to embrace an inclusive form of patriotism - part of an effort to prevent nationalist conservatives from presenting themselves as Poland’s leading advocates of the country’s interests. It is particularly important as his party’s candidate in a presidential election in May is expected to face a strong challenge from a 'nationalist' opposition candidate. (Source: LBC - United Kingdom)
Spain
(20 January 2025) 09:30 Spain premier aims to limit and ban non-EU citizens from buying homes - an attempt to fight a growing housing crisis when neither they nor their families live there and therefore they are speculating. Non-residents from outside the EU bought some 23,000 houses and flats in Spain during 2023 soaring prices, including in the capital, Madrid. Spain was seeing a shortfall of about 200,000 new houses every year based on current demand. Either proposal by Sanchez - taxing purchases at 100% their value, or an outright ban - would require approval from parliament. (Source: Luxembourg Times)
Greenland
January 20th, 2025 Neither the US nor Danish and Greenlandic authorities have so far found anything that warrants further military buildup in Greenland. It’s most crucial role in the defence of the North American continent is to facilitate radars and other means of domain awareness in order to know what flies in from Eurasia. The US Space Command operates radars at Pituffik, formerly known as Thule Air Base, that look for incoming missiles and monitors space-based threats. As Russia reopens bases along the Siberian coast, the US might want to defend those radars by, for instance, preparing the base for F35 jets. This is facilitated by the 1951 agreement, which will also facilitate new radars on the East coast of Greenland and on drones and vessels operating along the coast. Denmark has allocated some funds to this purpose. A misreading of dynamics across the distinct Arctic theatres, misguided militarisation of Greenland risks setting in motion a spiral of escalation that no one wants, will leave all less secure and will harm rather than help US national security and regional peace. Chinese activity is very far from Greenland, there are no Chinese investments or infrastructure. In the Far East, the Chinese navy has occasionally joined Russian coast guard manoeuvres in the Bering Strait near Alaska. Russia revamps Cold War bases to defend their onshore natural resources against possible adversaries. Russia is also developing the Northern Sea Road along the coast. Most activity concerns Liquefied Natural Gas from the Yamal peninsula in the East. There are indeed Russian and Chinese ships in the Arctic, but these vessels are too far away from Greenland. The US already controls the territory in terms of military security, as formalised in a 1951 agreement with Denmark co-signed by the autonomous Government of Greenland in 2004. In the European Arctic, Russia’s nuclear strategy depends on defending the Kola Peninsula where most of the missiles meant for the US are placed. In the event of a conflict, this involves pushing back NATO forces across Northern Scandinavia and the Barents Sea. Norway has recently invited the US and UK navies back, and each of the Scandinavian countries recently concluded agreements with the US to allow more flexible movement and stationing of troops. Russian second-strike capability in the event of a nuclear conflict relies on submarines having come out of Murmansk, hiding under the polar ice, and sneaking through the “GIUK” gap between Greenland, Iceland and the UK. The US, the UK and Norway are “phishing” for these submarines, Russian vessels in the vicinity of Greenland. Denmark is likely going to chip in as a result of the defence spending negotiations currently being concluded in the Danish parliament. Military investments are both immensely expensive under Arctic conditions and might escalate tensions in the Arctic without contributing positively to US security. Greenlanders, knowing their geography, fear no invasion. They do worry that civilian critical infrastructure is vulnerable to sabotage – particularly telecommunications that depend on only two submarine cables. (Source: London School of Economics - England)
Asia
Gaza
(Sunday), January 19, 2025 | 13:26 Israel today said a truce with Hamas began in Gaza at 0915 GMT, nearly three hours after initially scheduled, following a last-minute delay on the orders of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. During the delay, Gaza's civil defence agency said Israeli strikes killed eight people. A statement from Netanyahu's office, issued less than an hour before the truce had been set to start at 8:30 am (0630 GMT), said he had "instructed the IDF (military) that the ceasefire... will not begin until Israel has received the list" of hostages to be freed. Hamas attributed the delay to technical reasons, as well as the complexities of the field situation and the continued bombing, ultimately publishing at around 10:30 am the names of three Israeli women to be released today. Israel confirmed it had received the list and that the truce would begin at 11:15 am local time. The initial exchange was to see three Israeli hostages released from captivity in return for a first group of Palestinian prisoners. A total of 33 hostages taken by militants during Hamas's October 7, 2023 attack on Israel will be returned from Gaza during an initial 42-day truce. Under the deal, hundreds of Palestinian prisoners will be released from Israeli jails. Israel's justice ministry had previously said 737 Palestinian prisoners and detainees would be freed during the deal's first phase, starting from 4:00 pm (1400 GMT) today. Egypt yesterday said more than 1,890 Palestinian prisoners would be freed in the initial phase. Egyptian Foreign Minister Abdelatty said 600 trucks a day would enter Gaza after the ceasefire takes effect, including 50 carrying fuel. Of the 251 people taken hostage, 94 are still in Gaza, including 34 the Israeli military says are dead. Under the deal, Israeli forces will withdraw from densely populated areas of Gaza and allow displaced Palestinians to return "to their residences', the Qatari prime minister said. (Source: Gulf News - Dubai, United Arab Emirates / AFP - France)
North America
United States
January 17, 2025, 12:08 PM ’A new NATO deal for America’. More than 60 senior trans-Atlantic defense leaders have outlined a new NATO deal for the United States. In exchange for a significant European defense buildup, the United States would continue to deploy troops in Europe at about the current level. U.S. reserve forces that were once earmarked for a conflict in Europe would be able, if necessary, to shift their attention more to Asia. 'The European allies on their own must by 2030 collectively provide at least half of all the capabilities designated for NATO’s defense in Europe. This share should rise to two-thirds by 2035'. These minimum requirements would ’dictate defense spending at a level well above 3 percent of GDP’. The proposed charter suggests the creation of two European shield corps forward-deployed in Poland and Romania, backed up by four reserve European war-fighting corps. The four new reserve corps would be used to quickly transform the current Allied Reaction Force into an Allied Heavy Mobile Force. Europe will need to produce more so-called enablers, such as strategic airlift, air-to-air refueling, and operational intelligence. The United States would agree to permanently station fully ready units in Europe, including the U.S. Army’s V Corps, the Third Air Force, and the U.S. Navy’s 6th Fleet, along with Marine Corps and special operations forces units. To ensure smooth military operations, they would be complemented by cyberdefense, integrated air and missile defenses, and efforts to remove impediments to military mobility. NATO’s nuclear deterrence also needs to be strengthened, including broader nuclear-sharing arrangements and greater nuclear cooperation between Britain and France. ’The NATO-Russia Founding Act should be set aside for now’. The charter endorses creating a defense, security, and resilience bank, which has been under study by the NATO International Staff since 2019. Loans and loan guarantees would be made to NATO members and their defense industries. The charter proposes ways to significantly accelerate Europe’s ability to execute defense plans already developed for the alliance recently by the supreme allied commander Europe. It is now being circulated informally to European governments and the incoming Trump team. The charter was formally presented to senior NATO officials in Brussels last week. The upcoming June NATO Summit in The Hague would be the right place for alliance leaders ’to implement’ the ideas contained in Atlantic Charter 2025. European GDP growth averaging less than 1 percent in 2024 will make it difficult for many countries to increase defense spending without deep cuts elsewhere. (Source: Foreign Policy)
by Binnendijk, a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, former senior director for defense policy at the U.S. National Security Council, vice president of the National Defense University, legislative director for the U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee;
Vershbow, a distinguished fellow at the Atlantic Council, senior advisor at the University of Pennsylvania’s Perry World House, former U.S. ambassador to NATO and Russia, assistant defense secretary, and NATO deputy secretary-general.
.5 1 20 13:13
