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Asia
Iran
Friday 15 November 2024 15:02 GMT Iran sent a private letter delivered on October 14 to the Biden administration vowing it wouldn’t plot to kill Trump, according to a report. The letter from Tehran came in response to US officials’ private hand-written warning to the country in September, relating that any threats against the then-Republican nominee’s life would be “treated as an act of war". Tehran’s letter was not signed by a specific official. One week earlier the Justice Department announced that it had intercepted a fugitive Iranian government operative’s scheme to assassinate President-elect Trump before election day. Over the summer the Biden administration learned of credible threats targeting US politicians. Amid these alleged threats on his life, Trump told in late September, that he would consider a new nuclear agreement with the country - years after he pulled out of the 2015 landmark Iran nuclear deal during his first term. More recently, on Monday, Musk - Trump’s pick to lead the newly formed Department of Government Efficiency - met with Iran’s ambassador to the UN, in New York City. Iranian officials described the meeting to the New York Times as “positive” and “good news.” (Source: Independent - United Kingdom)
Israel
Friday, 15 November 2024 08:38 AM EST On Oct. 25, Israel destroyed a top secret Taleghan 2 nuclear weapons research facility in the Parchin military complex, located roughly 20 miles southeast of Tehran during its missile attack on Iran last month, it was reported today. The facility previously had been reported to be inactive. 'They conducted scientific activity that could lay the ground for the production of a nuclear weapon. It was a top secret thing. A small part of the Iranian government knew about this, but most of the Iranian government didn't,' one U.S. official told Axios. The attack destroyed sophisticated equipment used to design the plastic explosives that surround uranium in nuclear devices and are needed to detonate them, an ex-Israeli official told the outlet. After Israeli and U.S. intelligence detected research activity at Parchin earlier this year, White House officials warned the Iranians to stop the undertaking. Israel carried out a series of airstrikes against the Islamic Republic which did not appear to target facilities that would all but ensure a harsh Iranian response. Those most notably include Iran's oil infrastructure, the backbone of the OPEC member's economy, and its nuclear facilities. President Biden earlier last month said he would not support an Israeli strike on Iranian nuclear sites. Because Taleghan 2 was not part of Iran's declared nuclear program, Iran wouldn't be able to acknowledge the importance of the attack without admitting they violated the nuclear non-proliferation treaty. Iran has denied it is pursuing nuclear weapons. The Institute for Science and International Security reported that the Taleghan 2 facility, as part of the Iranian Amad nuclear weapons program, was used for testing explosives needed to set off a nuclear device before Iran supposedly halted its military nuclear program in 2003. After Israeli strikes last month, the institute acquired high-resolution satellite imagery showing the Taleghan 2 building was completely destroyed. (Source: Newsmax; "The Associated Press contributed" - U.S.)
Syria
(Friday), 15 November, 2024 Syria state media says second Israeli strike in two days hits the upscale Mazzeh district of Damascus, the neighbourhood home to embassies, security headquarters and United Nations offices today. The attacks coincided with an official visit to Damascus by Larijani, a senior adviser to Iran's supreme leader Ayatollah Khamenei,, who met with Syrian President Assad. The Syrian Observatory for Human Rights war monitor said the strikes targeted a "military housing complex' in Mazzeh. Israeli strikes yesterday in and around Damascus killed 23 people. Thursday's strike on Mazzeh killed 13 people, including civilians and Iran-backed fighters. An attack on the outskirts of Damascus killed 10 Palestinian Islamic Jihad militants. Islamic Jihad has fought alongside Hamas against Israeli forces in Gaza 'and has been at war with Israel before'. (Source: The New Arab, a London-based pan-Arab news outlet owned by a Qatari company)
North America
United States
November 15, 2024 Between activism and isolationism. Trump’s potential approach to the Middle East, identifying possible shifts and continuities, can include the Iran-Israel confrontation (centered on the Iranian nuclear program); the Arab-Israeli reconciliation (and the future of the Palestinian question); US military presence in Syria and Iraq; and broader efforts to reshape the Middle Eastern order within the context of US-China strategic competition. The scenarios and possibilities discussed here consider the tensions between two core factions within today’s Republican Party: an isolationist faction on the farther right of the party aligned with Trump’s “America First” vision, and a more activist faction that supports robust American power projection, though not through large-scale ground invasions as seen in Iraq or Afghanistan. Much in terms of the trajectory of Iran and Israel’s confrontation depends on the threat perception, risk calculation and strategic objectives of each side. The Iranian regime is caught between a rock and a hard place. Iran has been in a mostly reactive position since the Israeli attack on Iranian consulate in Damascus in April. Israel has gained strategic initiative over Iran and is the party that would decide whether, when, how, and where to escalate based on what price it is willing to pay for the ends that it defines for itself. Much in the US-Israel-Iran relations depends on the direction of Iran’s nuclear program and whether Iran will be willing to negotiate with a Trump administration. Trump has signaled on several occasions that he does not seek regime change in Tehran and that he wants an agreement over Iran’s nuclear program. Iranian officials are aiming to avoid the possibility of war with the United States or Israel. Iranian Vice-President for Strategic Affairs Zarif, a primary advocate of the former Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) nuclear deal on Iran’s side, has indicated that Tehran would enter into talks with Trump if it is treated with “respect.” During his previous term, Trump withdrew from the JCPOA and issued a twelve-point set of conditions for talks with Iran, which included: Terminating the military dimension of its nuclear program; Allowing rigorous and sudden inspections by the International Atomic Energy Agency; Halting Iran’s ballistic missile program; Ceasing support for regional proxies like Hezbollah, Hamas, and the Houthis, and: Disarming Iraqi militias and integrating them into Iraq’s security forces. Iran’s ’repeated attempts to assassinate’ Trump could influence Trump’s personal stance toward Iran, adding another layer of complexity for Tehran. A deal with Washington along the liens of the 12 points might seem like an act of capitulation for Iran. Without its network of regional militias, ballistic missile capabilities, and a nuclear program under stringent international monitoring, the Islamic Republic would undergo a transformation, appearing significantly weakened to both allies and adversaries. This could leave Iran vulnerable to external pressures and domestic unrest, given the government’s oppressive stance on civil liberties, women’s rights, ethnic minorities, and overall economic mismanagement. Rejecting a deal exposes Iran to the serious risk of escalating Israeli and even US attacks, particularly as its air defenses are now severely compromised following recent Israeli strikes in late October. Trump’s policy toward Tehran will also depend on the figures he appoints to key national security and foreign policy roles. Should individuals with strong anti-Islamic Republic views assume these positions, it would be reasonable to expect an aggressive stance from the administration toward Iran. Florida Senator Rubio, Trump’s choice to lead the State Department; former State Department Iran envoy Hook, overseeing the department’s transition; Hegseth, Trump’s nominee for Defense Secretary; Congressman Waltz, the nominee for National Security Advisor; Congresswoman Stefanik, the nominee for US’s UN ambassador role - all these figures are known for tough stances on Iran and strong support for US allies such as Israel. Evans, a prominent Evangelical leader and Trump advisor, told Israel’s i24News that president-elect Trump encouraged Israel to target Iran’s energy infrastructure during Biden’s remaining lame-duck period. With Hamas significantly weakened and Hezbollah decapitated, Netanyahu may feel emboldened to launch a comprehensive strike on Iran before or shortly after January 20 to diminish Tehran’s threat to Israel. The Trump administration is likely to pursue a maximum pressure campaign by imposing new sanctions on key Iranian industries, rigorously enforcing existing sanctions on Iranian oil sales, adopting a ’maximum support’ approach if domestic unrest occurred in Iran, and potentially backing Israeli strikes on Tehran - either to pressure Tehran into a new deal or to punish it severely for refusing one and for its regional behavior. Of Iran’s multi-layered deterrence strategies, only developing a nuclear weapon might shield it against future attacks and possible collapse, given the reduced effectiveness of its Resistance Axis and ballistic missile arsenal. 'With uranium enriched to 60 percent, Iran appears to be now capable of producing weapons-grade, 90-percent-enriched uranium within one to two weeks, as Secretary of State Antony Blinken indicated in July'. Taking actual steps toward building a bomb would certainly invite a devastating Israeli (and US) response. The Abraham Accords, establishing diplomatic ties between Israel and the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, Morocco, and Sudan were foreign policy achievements and legacy of the first Trump administration. A second Trump administration would likely prioritize securing a similar agreement between Saudi Arabia and Israel. Trump’s personal style of diplomacy and strong connections with Crown Prince Salman may aid in this process. Saudi Arabia seems to prefer a comprehensive approach, reiterating the need for a recognized Palestinian state as a precondition for any deal with Israel. Given Saudi Arabia’s leadership role in the Arab and Islamic worlds and its guardianship of Islam’s two holiest sites, the kingdom cannot afford to appear as abandoning the Palestinian cause. The Palestinian issue and militant groups remain potent forces that could disrupt any Arab-Israeli deal that overlooks them. If Kushner returns to a central role in Trump’s Middle East policy, the chances of a comprehensive Saudi-Israeli agreement may increase. A bilateral Saudi-US security agreement might be the most viable alternative. The ongoing presence of US troops in Syria and Iraq; Given Trump’s emphasis on ending ’endless wars’ abroad, he may be tempted to bring these troops home. Syria is currently divided into three primary zones, each backed by a major regional or global power. The western part of Syria is dominated by Assad, with the support of Iran, its regional proxies, and Russia; The Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) control the northern and northeastern energy-rich areas with the backing of a 900-strong US military deployment; Northwestern and parts of northern Syria are controlled by various, mainly Islamist groups supported by Turkey. As a transit point for weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon, Damascus has an unresolved territorial dispute with Israel over the Golan Heights, which has been under Israeli control since the 1967 War. Syria was a primary base of the islamic state (isis) and has recently witnessed troubling signs of isis resurgence. And Syria has become a site of ongoing tension between Turkey and Kurds. In 2019, Trump ordered a partial withdrawal of US troops from the border areas between Syria and Turkey, enabling Turkey to launch incursions and occupy significant portions of Kurdish-majority areas previously held by the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF). Kennedy Jr. recently stated that the president-elect wanted to withdraw the remaining US troops from Syria to avoid them becoming ’cannon fodder’ in the event of a regional conflict between the Assad regime and Turkey. A US withdrawal would likely lead to further instability in Syria. Pulling out the troops would trigger a bloody struggle by various local and regional contenders for the control. Of the SDF territory could potentially lead to the escape of hundreds, if not thousands, of captured isis elements and their radicalized family members from prisons and camps. National Security Advisor Waltz and State Secretary nominee Rubio strongly opposed Trump’s troops’ withdrawal from Syria in 2019. The United States and Iraq are neither true allies nor adversaries, despite the Strategic Framework Agreement they signed in 2008. Approximately 2,500 US troops are stationed in Iraq, advising Iraqi security forces, ensuring isis’s defeat. The growing dominance of pro-Iran groups within Baghdad’s state institutions, attacks of US forces in Iraq and Syria as part of Iran’s broader strategy to undermine US regional influence placed Iraq and the United States in a murky dynamic. Iran-backed militias have targeted both Israel and US force with dozens of attacks on Israel in the past six weeks. These actions contradict Iraq’s official stance. Recently, Iraqi and US officials reached an agreement for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026, with a small contingent remaining in the Kurdistan Region during the last year of this agreement to support the mission in neighboring Syria. This agreement awaits final approval from the US government. The incoming Trump administration may find it tempting to withdraw US troops from Iraq. Ongoing attacks on Israel could potentially make Iraq a target for the Israeli military. Washington has reportedly restrained Israel from adding Iraq to its list of targets. Iraq may also face sanctions due to militia activities, the ’continued smuggling of US-provided dollars’ to Iran and its proxies, and an Iraqi judicial arrest warrant for Trump following the killing of Soleimani and Muhandis, a senior leader of the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), the umbrella group for predominantly Iran-backed factions. Possibility of Washington revoking exemptions that allow Iraq to purchase Iranian natural gas for its power plants is a tangible prospect. Pressure on the Iraqi government toward meaningful security sector reforms could involve curbing the influence of Iran-backed armed factions and further integrating the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) into the state’s military-security structure. The United States could also alternatively maintain a long-term military presence in Iraqi Kurdistan to support the Syria mission. The Middle East remains integral to global rivalries by the desire to reduce US engagement. China flexed its diplomatic clout by brokering the 2023 Iran-Saudi deal. The region is central to global trade routes, as evidenced by initiatives like the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor and China’s Belt and Road Initiative, which seeks to integrate the region’s vast energy resources. For Washington it would feel compelled to continue strengthening its allies. Washington’s disengagement would likely invite interventions by China or Russia, or intensify regional rivalries among players like Israel, the Gulf Cooperation Council, Turkey, and Iran. Iran tend to design his policies in the region as part of a broader strategy to erode US influence and challenge the US-dominated global order. The selection of individuals for key foreign policy and national security roles suggests a lean toward a more engaged US presence in the region than retreat, continuity in support for Israel and harsher policy toward Iran. The future US policy could still reflect isolationist tendencies, a struggle between activist and isolationist inclinations within the Trump administration. Neither side is likely to gain full control, suggesting US Middle East policy will likely experience shifts in both directions. (Source: The Foreign Policy Research Institute (FPRI), based in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, U.S.)
by Salih, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow in the FPRI's Middle East Program.
4 11 17 22:52
