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Germany
(Saturday, 21 September 2024) Migrants feel less welcome as Germany's far-right rises. Anti-migrant ’far-right’ Alternative for Germany, or AfD, could win the most votes in the eastern German state of Brandenburg's election for a new regional parliament tomorrow. In Brandenburg polls show the AfD leading with 28%. To undermine support for the AfD, Chancellor Olaf Scholz’s left wing-led government on Monday introduced checks for migrants on all of Germany’s borders. He also wants to increase deportations of people whose application for asylum is unsuccessful. Opposition conservatives want the borders closed to asylum seekers altogether. Almost a decade ago the then-chancellor Angela Merkel refused to shut the borders to hundreds of thousands of people fleeing war and persecution in Syria and Afghanistan. In 2015 and 2016 around 1.5 million refugees and migrants were welcomed to Germany, mostly from the Middle East. Many Germans were suddenly proud of the country’s new-found identity as a safe haven for refugees. A new German word was invented, “Willkommenskultur” A record 200,000 people became German citizens in 2023. The New Germans largest group came from Syria. They are on average younger than the native-born population - 26 years old compared to the German average of 47 - and ’statistically’ more likely to be in work: 84% of the Syrian men who arrived in 2015 are in employment, compared to 81% of German-born men. Overall ’3.48 million refugees’ are now living in the country A third are from Ukraine. But, the 2015 ’welcome culture’ is hard to find today. New arrivals down this year by 22% compared to the same period in 2023. There is a nervousness in Germany that money and resources are tight. New Germans are thinking about leaving altogether. The paradox is that the government is desperate to attract workers to Germany. But the increasingly hostile rhetoric over migration may not only put people off coming, but also push away those go-getting New Germans. A study published last week by DeZIM, an institute that researches migration, found that almost a quarter of people with a migration background, many of them German citizens, are considering emigrating because of the rise of the far-right. Almost 10 percent say they have concrete plans to leave Germany. (Source: bbc)
Sep 21, 2024 The Leopard 2A6 tank sent to Ukraine stands as one of the most sophisticated main battle tanks globally. Armed with a 120mm Rheinmetall L55 smoothbore gun, it delivers exceptional firepower and accuracy. This formidable tank can launch a variety of ammunition, including armor-piercing, high-explosive, and even guided projectiles. Its state-of-the-art fire control system allows for accurate targeting even while on the move, and its thermal optic capabilities ensure precision in any visibility conditions. Underneath its armored exterior, the Leopard 2A6 boasts a powerful MTU MB 873 diesel engine with around 1,500 horsepower. This power grants it impressive maneuverability and speed. On roads, it can reach up to 72 km/h, and even off-road, it can move at speeds of up to 50 km/h. Weighing approximately 62.5 tons, it provides both stability and protection, thanks to its advanced design and multi-layered armor, composed of composite materials and equipped with active protection systems. When it comes to defense, the Leopard 2A6 is top-tier. Its combined armor is specifically engineered to deflect and absorb hits from anti-tank shells. Adding to its prowess, the tank is fitted with modern communication and control technologies, enabling seamless integration into contemporary combat networks. This capability is crucial for the effective coordination of combat units on today’s dynamic battlefield. The Leopard 2A6 made its combat debut during the mass offensives against Russian positions in early June 2023. It was among the first Western-supplied vehicles to be disabled and destroyed by Russian forces. Several Leopard 2 tanks have been captured by Russian force and studied extensively. A Leopard 2A4 was confirmed captured in December 2022, followed by a Leopard 2A6 in April 2023. In early September, footage surfaced showing the capture of another Leopard 2A6 and an M1 Abrams near the strategically crucial town of Avdiivka in the disputed Donbas region. The Russian military has been developing intricate strategies to combat Leopard 2A6 armored tanks, creatively leveraging reconnaissance and anti-tank drones. These drones deliver real-time updates on the location and movement of enemy tanks, effectively acting as sentinels on the battlefield. They relay critical data to commanders, who can then pinpoint weak spots in the Leopard 2A6 formations and orchestrate precise attacks. Some drones are even outfitted with small bombs or missiles, giving them the ability to strike armored units directly. The Russian forces also employ the Kornet anti-tank guided missile system, specifically engineered to cut through heavy armor. The Kornet boasts a range of up to 5.5 km and employs laser targeting to ensure remarkable accuracy. Once a drone locks onto a target, it communicates with the Kornet’s fire control system, which can swiftly dispatch missiles with pinpoint precision. This blended use of reconnaissance and direct attack enhances the success rate of their strikes, making the Leopard 2A6 notably vulnerable on the battlefield. Ukraine’s most capable Soviet-era tank, the T-80, which features a powerful gas turbine engine similar to the Abrams, has also been frequently seen facing significant losses. While Ukraine has received a significant number of Western-built tanks, most of these are older models such as the Leopard 1 and Leopard 2A4. The more advanced Leopard 2A6 is often reserved for elite units like the 47th Mechanized Brigade. While videos increasingly showcase the obliteration of Ukraine’s other advanced Western-supplied tank, the M1A1 Abrams, the Leopard 2A6 has appeared less frequently on the battlefield. Deployed to the front lines much earlier, these tanks have rarely been spotted in combat scenarios. According to German sources, as of early January, only a small number of Ukraine’s Leopard 2A6 tanks remain operational, with the fleet suffering significant combat losses. The Leopard 2A6 tank fleet in Ukraine is on the big verge of defeat. Neither Berlin nor Washington has indicated plans to send more Leopard 2A6 or M1 Abrams tanks. Within the past 24 hours, news broke that Australia and the United States are in discussions to supply M1 Abrams tanks, retired from Australian service to Ukraine. According to unofficial sources, the number of tanks proposed is substantial. (Source: bulgarianmilitary)
by Nikolov
Nagorno-Karabakh
Saturday 21 September 2024 08:47, UK Nagorno-Karabakh was claimed by both Azerbaijan and Armenia after the fall of the Russian Empire in 1917, and in Soviet times it was designated its official location an autonomous region within Azerbaijan. As the Soviet Union crumbled, the Armenians in the region - which Armenians call Artsakh- started a movement to unite with Armenia. This was followed by the first war, with Armenian forces taking control of the region and capturing seven surrounding regions as a "buffer zone" in the early 1990s. With no resolution to the conflict and no agreement over the status of Nagorno-Karabakh, there were frequent but mostly low-level exchanges of fire across the region's border with Azerbaijan following the first war. From 1988 to 1994 about 30,000 people were killed. Armenians in Azerbaijan were victims of pogroms, while Azeris claimed discrimination and violence in Armenia. Around 500,000 Azeris from Nagorno-Karabakh and the areas around it were displaced, 350,000 Armenians left Azerbaijan and 186,000 Azerbaijanis left Armenia. In April 2016, at least 200 were killed in a four-day skirmish. An estimated 6,000 people died during the 44-day war in 2020, with Azerbaijan the victors. It saw Baku regain seven surrounding territories occupied by Armenians since the first war in 1994 as well as a third of the region itself. The latest attack by the much larger Azerbaijani army began on 19 September and lasted 24 hours, forcing the region's leadership to surrender and agree to dissolve its self-styled republic by January 2024. The Armenians had already endured acute shortages of food, fuel and medicine in a nine-month Azerbaijani blockade cutting off the region's road connection with Armenia, the Lachin corridor. That road had been reopened by Azerbaijan shortly before the bombs started falling, and would within days allow Armenians to leave the territory. During a desperate search for fuel, some Armenians were queuing at a storage facility near capital city Stepanakert on 25 September when a huge explosion killed more than 200 people. With no real sign of Russian peacekeepers - stationed in the region as part of the second war's ceasefire agreement - intervening, panic began to spread among the Armenians. Azerbaijan's attack on the enclave - which had been ethnically Armenian but is recognised internationally as Azeri land - one year ago forced 100,000 Armenians on an arduous escape to leave their home - possibly for good. The job market in Armenia is mainly concentrated in and around the capital, where housing is most expensive, and the border regions offer few opportunities. Other refugees have chosen to settle elsewhere, with some relocating to Russia, which was once seen by some Armenians in Nagorno-Karabakh as their guarantor. With Armenian state support ending in January next year and local media reporting little more than 4,000 refugees have applied for citizenship, some believe more will choose to leave Armenia entirely. Nearly 11,500 refugees are said to have emigrated already, as of July. The refugees’ fate has echoes of the trauma suffered by Azerbaijanis for nearly three decades. While Nagorno-Karabakh has a significant Armenian history, for centuries it was also home to tens of thousands of Azeris, who became internally displaced people (IDPs) following the first war. While Azeris have the chance to finally return, it appears unlikely they will be joined in the foreseeable future by Armenians, many of whom fear living under an Azerbaijani government. Azerbaijan's autocratic president Aliyev, who replaced his late father in 2003, has frequently used anti-Armenian rhetoric. In a speech in December 2022, he said Armenia - referred to as ’Western Azerbaijan’ - "’was never present in this region before’ and "present-day Armenia is our land’. "It's impossible for the civilian population to live under Azerbaijani governance without some kind of international guarantee,” according to Tigran, the head of Regional Center for Democracy and Security, a Yerevan-based thinktank. 'Armenia's government hasn't been successful in raising awareness and funds internationally," Tigran said. Kim, a senior official at the US State Department, told a Senate Foreign Relations Committee "we will not tolerate any attack on the people of Nagorno-Karabakh" just days before Azerbaijan's offensive. Statements like that ’have not corresponded to the reality’, Tigran said, and it has been "business as usual' with Azerbaijan. For years, the Nagorno-Karabakh issue has been referred to as a frozen - or forgotten – conflict. Since the second war, there remains a sense among Armenians they have been abandoned. People lived there, but the world stayed silent, as if nothing was happening to them. "The predominant feeling among refugees is they feel abandoned from all governments.’ (Source: news.sky)
by Minassian
Russia
September 21, 2024 “Russian authorities have reportedly tasked Russian forces with pushing Ukrainian forces out of Kursk Oblast by mid-October 2024 and establishing a "buffer zone" into Ukrainian border areas along the international border with Russia in northeastern Ukraine by the end of October - significant undertakings that the Russian military is very unlikely to achieve in such a short period of time,' the Institute for the Study of War assessed in its latest operational estimate of the war. According to Ukrainian sources, the Russian military has gathered almost 40,000 men in the Kursk Oblast for the upcoming push to expel the Ukrainian forces in the area. The Kremlin seems to have a set a deadline to achieve this goal by the middle of October. “Putin has since remained committed to his crypto mobilization campaign, constraining Russia's mobilization potential,” the Institute for the Study of War added. (Source: nationalinterest)
September 21, 2024 As casualties mount in Kursk and Russia gains ground in Donetsk, the political cost of retreating will become higher, and Ukraine risks falling victim to the sunk cost fallacy. Once it became clear that the offensive failed to achieve its primary objective of diverting Russian forces away from the Donbas, Ukraine should have withdrawn from the border region to stabilize the frontline. Instead, Kyiv appears determined to stay in Kursk in hopes that it could be used as a bargaining chip in future negotiations, whereas Russia has prioritized its offensive in the Donbas. Ukraine has deployed over 15,000 troops, including elite units, to the Kursk region, thereby exacerbating its manpower shortage and allowing Russia to accelerate its advance in the east. As a result, Russian troops are now less than ten kilometers away from Pokrovsk, a key logistics hub, and their offensive is intensifying in the northwest of Donetsk, towards Chasiv Yar, and in the southwest, in Vuhledar. It seems as though Kyiv is placing too much political importance on Kursk; President Zelensky has argued in favor of bringing the war to Russia. Despite embarrassing the Kremlin, again, the incursion does not represent a threat to the regime, nor does it severely undermine its war effort, which is why it did not trigger a dramatic escalation. Ukraine has seized over 1000 square kilometers of Russian land, the territory itself is of limited strategic value and only consists of Suzha, a town of 5000 people, and small neighboring villages. If the objective is to force the Kremlin to negotiate a land swap, then Ukraine has to prove that it can hold the territory indefinitely. If after several weeks or months, Russia is still unable to fully dislodge Ukrainian troops, it may decide to use more destructive means, including the use of glide bombs, on Ukrainian-occupied territory. At some point, Ukraine will have to withdraw from the region; otherwise, it will incur a staggering loss of troops and resources. What started as a tactical success quickly became a strategic blunder. (Source: thenationalinterest *)
* The National Interest, an American bimonthly international relations magazine
